The Application and Development of the Polluter-Pays
Posted: January 5th, 2023
The Application and Development of the Polluter-Pays
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The Application and Development of the Polluter-Pays
Introduction
Marine pollution can be termed as pollution that happens as a result of human activities resulting in harm to biological resources and all the life in the aquatic world. Pollution and contamination is magnified by an awareness of the infinite resources of the oceans and the rule of freedom of the sea.[1] The report focuses on the application of the PPP across various jurisdictions and highlights the international framework that work in the same way as PPP. It identifies the transfer of liability cost to consumers as the main limitation of the PPP, and an issue that require considerable attention from all stakeholders. The study provides considerable description of other international regulations such as the HNS Convention, BUNKER, and the UNCLOS III. Adhering to PPP and related regulations help to protect marine environment and promotes the attempts to achieve sustainability.
Describing the Polluter-Pays Principle
The polluter-pays principle is the widely accepted practice that those who emit pollutants or are responsible for pollution should be liable for bearing the costs of mitigating the pollution so that it the damage does not affect the environment or human health. For example, a company that emits a potentially adverse substance as a by-product of its operations is often held responsible for its safe clearance. Ezeanokwasa informs that the polluter-pays principle (PPP) holds polluters liable for environmental degradation and pollution generated by them by getting them give financial remuneration.[2] The polluter pays principle is part of a group of wider guidelines to regulate sustainable development internationally, formerly referred to as the 1992 Rio Declaration, which aimed at achieving sustainability and a better quality of life for everyone, which urging states to reduce and eradicate unstainable forms of production and consumption and encourage the formation of suitable demographic laws and policies.[3] The concept was originally formed in 1920s as an economic regulation in managing environmental issues, and its development provided an answer to the concern of inappropriate allocation of costs emanating from pollution.[4] The unsuitable allocation of the costs of production emerged from the idea that hitherto the price of addressing environmental damage were not regarded as an essential aspect of the production costs of the organizations or individuals who cause the damage. Initially the costs were directed to the society at large, but not to the specific polluters responsible for the pollution.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) endorsed the PPP in 1972 as the guiding rule regarding the International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies. A year later the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment and the Declaration of the Council of the European Communities recommended PPP as one of the chief guidelines of Community’s environmental framework.[5] The European Community adopted the principle from 1973 as a permanent guide in environmental legislation. The PPP was elevated to the position of a constitutional principle in 1987, especially within the European Community, and later adopted by the Treaty on European Union in 1992.[6] The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation that took place in London in 1992 regarded PPP as an overall guideline of environmental law. Acknowledging PPP as an inclusive guideline of environmental law, the UN embraced it as one of the major frameworks for attaining sustainable environment and development during the adoption of Rio Declaration in 1992.[7] The Declaration held that national administrators should aspire to encourage the internalization of environmental costs, and the utilization of economic instruments, while taking into consideration the notion that the polluter should in accordance with the regulation, carry the costs of pollution, with adequate consideration to the public interests and without tampering with global investment and trade. Consequently, state-members of the global community are required to apply the PPP framework in their legislations on issues that have effect on the environment.
What Does the Polluter Pay?
Before dwelling much into what a violator pays, it is first essential to understand PPP’s description of a polluter. Ezeanokwasa informs that not only human beings can be polluters, and that legal entities such as companies can pollute the environment considering that pollution can emanate from their activities.[8] The European Council identifies three classes of polluters; people or a person who directly tampers with the environment, a person who inflict indirect damage on the environment, and a person who develops conditions resulting in such damages. An example of a person who directly tampers with the quality of the environment would be a company that emits thick unfiltered smoke into the air from its chimneys or an oil production firm that spills a large volume of oil during drilling or transportation. On the other hand, an instance of a person who cause indirect harm on the environment would be a company that whose products cause harm to the environment.
The term ‘polluter pays’ provides an incorrect view that the violator intrinsically carries the costs of their damage or externalities. All the polluter does is to fuse the externalities with their private costs, but does not actually give financial payment. Often the polluter transmits the costs to the buyers who ultimately purchase and utilize the product. Munir underscored this issue when he suggested that it was necessary to introduce incentives to motivate the violator to internalize the external costs so that the entire cost of production would reflect in the price of the products which the buyer ultimately pays.[9] But before the purchaser can pay for them, the violator has to internalize them first and it is in this perspective that it is perceived that the polluter pays for the environmental harm. PPP does not imply that the polluter has to physically pay for the costs of harming the environment. Though this is necessary, it is not practical for a number of factors. The first reason is that it is not possible to determine absolute abatement of pollution because the practice is so much entrenched in human life and society that it cannot be eradicated entirely. Ezeanokwasa compares pollution with criminal acts which no society aims at eliminating but at limiting it to very low levels. What many jurisdictions usually focus on is regulating pollution at a reasonable level and not eliminating it entirely.[10] Second, the attempts to eradicate pollution entirely has considerable negative consequences for national economic productivity. For instance, dedicating much resources to eliminating pollution would require additional costs which would escalate the cost of production to unaffordable rates such that investment and trade, both globally and locally, would be seriously tampered with. Emphasizing this aspect, Munir observes that most published works do not accept the aspect of zero pollution or completely eradicating pollution.[11] He presents the aspect rather sharply when he states that striving towards zero pollution refers to zero economic activities. The reality is evident within the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) where despite the widespread adoption of PPP, still all the external costs are not entirely internalized in the affiliates of the international organisation. For example, in spite of America relying extensively for its energy consumption on imported petroleum energy, yet the option of gas is far much affordable in the U.S. than in some nations, it still acquires crude oil from other countries, for example, Nigeria. The issue that many still try to resolve is the meaning of PPP with regard to what the regulation should make a violator pay if it is difficult to internalize all the external costs.
Veiga and Wonham provide information, which supports the idea that many nations in the North East Atlantic are yet to fully embrace the concept where polluters face direct liability for payment. Veiga and Wonham informs about the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation (OPRC) of 1990, specifically Article 6, which holds that countries individually or in collaboration with other states or various industries will develop and maintain prepositioned oil spills combating units.[12] The authors further describe how the HNS-OPRC Protocol adopted in 2000 and the OPRC 1990 demand that the PPP be taken into consideration as a general guide of global environmental law. Veiga and Wonham argue that with few exceptions, most of the nations have shifted the charges of preparedness measures to the buyers and have made insignificant attempts to transfer the costs directly to the shipping sector in line with PPP. . Veiga and Wonham feel that in the North East Atlantic member states are significantly challenged in terms of maintaining financial preparedness. [13] Despite this concern, insignificant attempts have been adopted to shift the burden to the real or potential polluters.
To this concern the OECD clarified that the chief reasons for developing the PPP was to promote the countrywide utilization of environmental resources and to avoid distortions in global investment and trade. Thus, PPP is not entirely about safeguarding the environment, but is equally for ensuring that the interests of trade and global trade are not affected. Interests of international investment and trade would be tampered with if the price of mitigating pollution is such that foreign direct investors are not locked out and local operators would not be able to produce their product. The OECD clarifies that what a violator pays has to balance between the two different interests.[14] The organization informs that the externalities internalized by the polluter does not have to be in such a way that it increases the cost of production to an extent that trade and investment are affected. Similarly, the societal price not internalized by the violator must not be too high as to push the cost of other economic operations such that they affect global trade and investment.
Implementation of PPP across Jurisdictions
The NHS Convention
The NHS Convention of 1996 is an example of a PPP directive that pursues to attain adequate, speedy, and active payment or compensation for harm to property and persons, costs of alleviation, and restoration guidelines and monetary losses originating from oceanic movements of harmful and risky components. The Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization has formed a special team (Correspondence Group) to facilitate the implementation of the HNS Convention.[15] The Maritime Organization organised an International Conference in London in 1996 where it adopted the HNS Convention. The team was inspired by the successful organization of the Civil Liability and Fund Convention, which looks into the damages caused by pollution occurring from oil spillage from tankers. As with the initial oil pollution compensation framework, the HNS will create a two-tier approach for payment to be offered in case of accidents on large water bodies, in this case, entailing harmful and noxious substances such as oil and chemicals.[16] Tier one will be settled by ship owners, who would be able to minimize their liability. In those scenarios where the insurance does not pay for fatal incidents, or is not enough to meet the claims, a second tier or payment will be reimbursed from a fund, comprised of donations from those who have to abide by HNS. Consequently, contributions are estimated depending on the total amount of HNS generated in each member state in the coming year. The HNS Convention had still not entered into force by 2009 because of inadequate ratifications. A Protocol to the HNS Convention, also called the 2010 HNS Protocol was adopted during the Second International Conference with the objective of addressing practical issues that had barred many countries from acknowledging the initially developed Convention.[17] The 1996 HNS Convention that was amended to be the 2010 Protocol will continue to undergo significant transformations with the objective of making it more effective, practical, and inclusive.
The HNS Convention provides considerable guidelines on how much payment will be available in case of pollution and also on the type of damage that will be covered by the regulation. The regulation stipulates that where harm is generated by HNS in large volume, the owner of the ship will usually be able to regulate their financial liability to an amount ranging from 10 million and 100 million SDR (special drawing rights) of the IMF (International Monetary Fund, which translates to $15 million to $150 million, based on the entire tonnage of the carrier. Where harm is generated by an HNS-affiliate, the whole obligation for the proprietor of the vessel is about 115 million SDR, which reflects to approximately $175 million.[18] The HNS fund will offer an extra level of compensation to up to $380 million, encompassing any sum dispensed to the possessor of the vessel and the guarantor. Besides, the HNS Convection gives specific guidelines on the type of damage that the treaty covers. It also comes in case of pollution damage in an economic zone, or any other specified area, of a member country and harm (other than pollution damage) introduced by HNS transported via a carrier registered under an affiliate state beyond the territorial waters of any country.[19] The Convention outlines that compensation is possible if; the incident, which in this case could be an oil spill, results in personal injury or loss of life on board or outside the vessel bearing the HNS, the incident causes significant damage or loss of property outside the ship, and if the occurrence caused economic losses occurring from the spillage, such as in the tourism, aquaculture, and fishing sectors. The Convention also covers costs of practical measures of restoration of the environment, as well as the cost of preventive practices, such as clean-up activities onshore and at sea.
The HNS Fund will be created once the HNS Convention becomes effective. Countries that approve the 2010 HNS Protocol will qualify as members of the Fund that will give the second tier of reimbursement and will be governed by a Secretariat under the leadership of a Director. The HNS Fund is projected to work in a similar way to the IOPC Funds (International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds and will be regulated by an Assembly comprising of state representatives from its affiliates.[20] The Fund will also be governed by a Committee that addresses the claims for compensation, and will function in the same manner as the Executive Committee regulating IOPC Funds.
The HNS Convention provides clear guidance to ship owners regarding their role in case of any damage from their side. The Agreement specifies that vessel proprietors have firm responsibility for any damage created by HNS member countries, which implies that the possessor of the carrier will be answerable even without destruction on the part of the ship or its troop. The ship owner will have the obligation to have insurance to stand for his liabilities under the regulation. Often, indemnity and protection insurers will provide the insurance.
Bunker Convention
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (BUNKER) that is applicable in many countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Australia is another regulation that takes the form of PPP. The Convention was adopted on the twenty third day of March 2001 and came into action five months later after its formation.[21] The principal goal for its development was to guarantee that sufficient, real, and rapid reimbursement is accessible to those who undergo loss produced by oil spills, when transported in ship.[22] The directive shields destruction produced on the specified region, encompassing the regional sea, and in selected commercial zones of state affiliates. The Convention offers an independent tool covering harm by contamination alone.[23] Pollution damage according to the regulation refers to; damage or loss caused outside the vessel by contamination emanating from the discharge of bunker oil from the carrier, wherever such emissions may happen, provided that reward for impairment of the environment other than drop in profit from such damage will be restricted to costs of reasonable guidelines of reinstatement, and the expenditures of preventive guidelines and further harm caused by preventive measures.
The convention is arranged in the universal pact on public obligation for oil contamination harm that was launched in 1969. The vital requirement in it is the need for the registered ship owner to keep essential insurance cover. Another chief directive of the Convection is the directive of direct action because this permits a claim for compensation for pollution harm to be brought directly against the one providing insurance.[24] The regulation require vessel owners over 1000 tonnage to maintain financial security such as insurance or a bank’s guarantee or similar financial institutions, to stand in for the liability of the registered proprietor for pollution harm in an amount similar to the measures of liability under the relevant international or national limitation regimes, but in all scenarios, not surpassing a figure formulated in relation with the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims of 1976.[25]
Application of PPP in the UK
Various environmental regulations in the UK, including those on mitigation of damage at source, preventive principles, precautionary regulations, and the PPP are all embedded into the European Union Treaties, through TFEU 191(2). The treaty obligations infiltrate down to specific environmental regulations, whether through the EU regulations and any directive at the local level.[26] The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) periodically looks at and interprets the environmental regulations to ensure that they meet specific measures. The Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU 191(2), Part Three (Union Policies and Internal Actions), Title 20 provides clear guidelines that the UK follows when protecting its marine environment from considerable harm, especially from polluters. Title 20, Article 191 stipulates that the Union’s policy on environment shall add onto the pursuit of various objectives including, upholding, safeguarding, and advancing the nature of the aquatic environment, safeguarding human health, promoting practical and balanced use of natural resources.[27] Besides, the policy seeks to promote measures at the global stage to address the global and regional environmental issues threatening the marine environment. The UK abides to the regulation, which stipulates that the authorities should enact high level of protection taking into consideration the diversity of pollution in various regions.[28] The policy calls for adoption of precautionary measures that seek to prevent pollution of the marine environment at the source, additionally proposing imposing charges, equivalent to the damage, upon violation of the same.
Application of PPP in Indonesia
The PPP in Indonesia is guided by Law Number 32 of 2009 on Protection and Management of the Environment. The first paragraph of Article 8 directs that all stakeholders in charge of a corporation or activities that commits an unlawful act in the form of pollution or damage to the environment which causes loss or harm to others or the environment is mandated to offer compensation and take other necessary actions.[29] The guideline of environmental management is conducted following the principles of cohesiveness, benefits, state responsibility, biodiversity, and polluter pays. Also the principle of environmental protection is executed based on other factors such as preservation and sustainability, precautionary, harmony and stability, regional autonomy, and good leadership. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries are in the forefront in ensuring that the nation and no individual or corporation goes against the PPP.[30] Both arms of the government abide by the directive of the first paragraph of Article 90, which calls on government agencies to take responsibility for maintaining the environment and protecting it from any harm. The main challenge to the application of PPP in Indonesia is the absence of clarity about the implementation of the principle in marine law. It is in such a way that marine law PPP is not governed in the chief provisions, but instead directly placed in the guidelines concerning disputes and the enforcement of sanctions. Thus, the implementers should work towards overcoming the challenge to achieve the desired outcome.
Implication on States, Ship Owners, and other Operators in the Oil Sector
Various operators learn from the analysis that today, there are some marine pollution litigations introduced by oil spills from water vessels. The incidences create a considerable effect on marine environment and threatening human life and existence. Thus, the study shows the significance of adopting law enforcement, especially the PPP, which is enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Various stakeholders learn the importance of being familiar with the PPP that was formed and adopted by the OECD, and know how its various aspects work.[31] They understand that it is their obligation based on the policy, to pay for the pollution they have caused through oil spill. All stakeholders need to acknowledge that the PPP does not only focus on the allocation cost of avoidance, eradication, and payment of environmental implications but also underscores measures of direct engagement and conduct such as prohibitions and orders, incentive charges, and leads to claims, which require responsible teams to react, or to claim regarding liability under the civil law.[32] Besides, polluters learn the importance of taking direct liability for the damage rather than transferring the burden to the tax payers as it happens today as well as embrace guidelines to manage the environment.[33] The study informs operators that are potential polluters to observe other regulations that could help to preserve the environment, especially the oceans from oil spillages.
Other than following the provisions of the 2010 HNS Convention and the Bunker Convention, operators and all stakeholders can inquire about the directives of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea also known as the Law of the Sea treaty, which is an international treaty that emanated from the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which happened in a span of nine years.[34] Operators and other stakeholders are likely to acquire valuable tips from the directives of Article 192 of UNCLOS III, which sites that states must safeguard and preserve the marine ecosystem.[35][36] Furthermore, they are likely to acquire valuable insight into how to relate with the marine environment from Article 194 of UNCLOS, which classifies ships transporting potential pollutants as one of the major threats to marine quality.[37] Article 194 (3) (b) directs that pollution from ships and other water vessels, specifically measures for abating fatalities and handling disasters, safeguarding the safety of activities at sea, protecting deliberate and unintentional emissions, and guiding the design, manufacturing, installation, and operation of marine vessels. Embracing all these concepts would result in a scenario where few incidents of pollution emerge, and where violators take liability for polluting the marine environment.
Conclusion
The PPP proves to be an effective regulation that seeks to protect the environment from considerable harm by asking the offender to be liable for their damages. However, it is imperative to make considerable changes that would make polluters directly liable for their pollution that results in significant loss or damage. Operators may also acquire valuable information regarding how to protect the marine environment and possible penalties by acquiring information from the HNS Convention, the Bunker Convention, and UNCLOS III. These directives pass valuable lessons to all stakeholders, who may play essential functions towards safeguarding the marine ecosystem and promoting environmental sustainability.
References
Ann Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press 2001)
Ayobami Olaniyan, ‘Imposing Liability for Oil Spill Clean-Ups in Nigeria: An Examination of
the Role of the Polluter-Pays Principle’ [2015] 40 JLPG 73
Bonus Hall and Peris Holgar, “Implications of the Polluter Pays and the User Pays Principles for
Developing Countries” in Edward Dommen (ed), Fair Principles for Sustainable
Development, (Cambridge, 1993), 67
Chris Hilson, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle in the Privy Council: Fishermen and Friends of the
Sea (Appellant) v The Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment (Respondent)
(Trinidad and Tobago) [2017] UKPC 37’ [2018] 30 (3) JEL 507
EUR-Lex, ‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (EUR-Lex, 2012) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E191> accessed 12 December 2020
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2019) < https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-
Civil-Liability-for-Bunker-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(BUNKER).aspx> accessed 6
December 2020
IOPC Funds, ‘The HNS Convention and the 2010 Protocol’ (IOPC Funds, 2019) <
convention/#:~:text=The%20International%20Convention%20on%20Liability,of%20cle
an%20up%20and%20reinstatement> accessed 6 December 2020
James Powell, Oil Spills (Franklin Watts 2002)
Jesper Jarl Fano, Enforcing International Maritime Legislation on Air Pollution through
UNCLOS (Hart Publishing 2019)
Jude Ezeanokwasa, ‘Polluter-Pays Principle and the Regulation of Environmental Pollution in
Nigeria: Major Challenges,’ [2018] 70 JLPG 45
Kola Odeku and Bapela Paulos Prohibition of Pollution of Marine Environments: Challenges and
Prospects (Penguin 2017)
Karen Hulme and Damien Short, ‘Ecocide and the Polluter Pays Principle: The Case of
Fracking’ [2014] ES 7
Kola Odeku and Bapela Paulos, ‘Prohibition of Pollution of Marine Environments: Challenges
and Prospects’ [2017] 8 (3) EE 127
Ling Zhu, Compulsory Insurance for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Oxford University Press
2007)
Marlene Veiga and John Wonham, ‘Applying the “Polluters Pays Principle” to Fund Oil Spill
Preparedness in the North East Atlantic’ [2001] 1 IOSCP 357
Mean Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University press 2008)
Muhammad Munir, ‘History and Evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle: How an Economic
Idea Became a Legal Principle? [2013] <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2322485>
accessed 6 December 2020
Peter Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Prevent the Destruction of Our Planet (Shepheard-Walwyn 2010)
Stephen Fletcher et al. ‘Public Awareness of Marine Environmental Issues in the UK’ [2009] 33
(2) MP 370
UNCTAD, ‘Review of Maritime Transport 2010 (UN 2010)
United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ [2020] <
accessed 6 December 2020
Zharifah Ulfah and Nellyyana Roesa, ‘The Implementation of Polluter-Pays Principles on
Marine Pollution Caused by Vessels in Indonesia’ [2020] 4 (2) SKLJ 198
[1] James Powell, Oil Spills (Franklin Watts 2002) 17
[2] Jude Ezeanokwasa, ‘Polluter-Pays Principle and the Regulation of Environmental Pollution in Nigeria: Major Challenges,’ [2018] 70 JLPG 45
[3] Ibid
[4] Bonus Hall and Peris Holgar, Implications of the Polluter Pays and the User Pays Principles for Developing Countries in Edward Dommen (ed), Fair Principles for Sustainable Development, (Cambridge, 1993), 68
[5] Jude Ezeanokwasa, ‘Polluter-Pays Principle and the Regulation of Environmental Pollution in Nigeria: Major Challenges,’ [2018] 70 JLPG 46
[6] Karen Hulme and Damien Short, ‘Ecocide and the Polluter Pays Principle: The Case of Fracking’ [2014] ES 8
[7] Stephen Fletcher et al. ‘Public Awareness of Marine Environmental Issues in the UK’ [2009] 33 (2) MP 376
[8] Ibid, 47
[9] Muhammad Munir, ‘History and Evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle: How an Economic Idea Became a Legal Principle? [2013] <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2322485> accessed 6 December 2020
[10] Jude Ezeanokwasa, ‘Polluter-Pays Principle and the Regulation of Environmental Pollution in Nigeria: Major Challenges,’ [2018] 70 JLPG 48
[11] Muhammad Munir, ‘History and Evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle: How an Economic Idea Became a Legal Principle? [2013] <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2322485> accessed 6 December 2020
[12] Marlene Veiga and John Wonham, ‘Applying the “Polluters Pays Principle” to Fund Oil Spill Preparedness in the North East Atlantic’ [2001] 1 IOSCP 358
[13] Marlene Veiga and John Wonham, ‘Applying the “Polluters Pays Principle” to Fund Oil Spill Preparedness in the North East Atlantic’ [2001] 1 IOSCP 359
[14] Chris Hilson, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle in the Privy Council: Fishermen and Friends of the Sea (Appellant) v The Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment (Respondent) (Trinidad and Tobago) [2017] UKPC 37’ [2018] 30 (3) JEL 507
[15] IOPC Funds, ‘The HNS Convention and the 2010 Protocol’ (IOPC Funds, 2019) < https://www.hnsconvention.org/the-convention/#:~:text=The%20International%20Convention%20on%20Liability,of%20clean%20up%20and%20reinstatement> accessed 6 December 2020
[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid
[18] IOPC Funds, ‘The HNS Convention and the 2010 Protocol’ (IOPC Funds, 2019) < https://www.hnsconvention.org/the-convention/#:~:text=The%20International%20Convention%20on%20Liability,of%20clean%20up%20and%20reinstatement> accessed 6 December 2020
[19] Ibid
[20] Mean Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University press 2008) 72
[21] Ling Zhu, Compulsory Insurance for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Oxford University Press 2007) 25
[22] IMO, ‘International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage’ (IMO, 2019) < https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Bunker-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(BUNKER).aspx> accessed 6 December 2020
[23] Ibid, 25
[24] Kola Odeku and Bapela Paulos, ‘Prohibition of Pollution of Marine Environments: Challenges and Prospects’ [2017] 8 (3) EE 128
[25] IMO, ‘International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage’
[26] EUR-Lex, ‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’
(EUR-Lex, 2012) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E191> accessed 12 December 2020
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid
[29] Zharifah Ulfah and Nellyyana Roesa, ‘The Implementation of Polluter-Pays Principles on Marine Pollution Caused by Vessels in Indonesia’ [2020] 4 (2) SKLJ 206
[30] Zharifah Ulfah and Nellyyana Roesa, ‘The Implementation of Polluter-Pays Principles on Marine Pollution Caused by Vessels in Indonesia’ [2020] 4 (2) SKLJ 198
[31] Zharifah Ulfah and Nellyyana Roesa, ‘The Implementation of Polluter-Pays Principles on Marine Pollution Caused by Vessels in Indonesia’ [2020] 4 (2) SKLJ 198
[32] UNCTAD, ‘Review of Maritime Transport 2010 (UN 2010) 10
[33] Peter Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Prevent the Destruction of Our Planet (Shepheard-Walwyn 2010) 82
[34] Ann Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press 2001) 47
[35] United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ [2020] < https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> accessed 6 December 2020
[36] Jesper Jarl Fano, Enforcing International Maritime Legislation on Air Pollution through UNCLOS (Hart Publishing 2019) 26
[37] Ibid
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