Hybrid Regimes – Implications of the Shift of Turkey’s Governance from a Tutelary Democratic to Competitive Authoritarian System

Posted: January 4th, 2023

Hybrid Regimes – Implications of the Shift of Turkey’s Governance from a Tutelary Democratic to Competitive Authoritarian System

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Hybrid Regimes – Implications of the Shift of Turkey’s Governance from a Tutelary Democratic to Competitive Authoritarian System

The Justice and Development Party, also called the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), is the party that now dominates Turkish politics. The party has gradually developed a so-called competitive authoritarian power (regime) with the motive of securing and consolidating its political might and power. The administration is amalgam, and bases its philosophies based on open-minded values, including improved focus on defending civil liberties, eliminating tutelary establishments, lessening collective suffrage, and endorsing free and fair elections, among other issues. AKP also allows for a sensibly reasonable level of political completion between the ruling political party and the opposing side. On the contrary, however, the AKP displays some undemocratic characteristics, including unfair electoral practices, contravention of civil liberties, and unequal political competitiveness. Unfortunately, the Turkish competitive authoritarian regime derail the achievement of democratic practices because the party enacts much forces to safeguard its ideologies, and to suppress any oppositional forces against its practices and regime. The attempts to develop a competitive authoritarian regime deters people’s desire to achieve a democratic government. The study indicates that the attempts to develop an authoritarian power have negatively impacted on the military, electoral processes, media, and civil liberty, and interferes with the roles that each of these groups play in ensuring that Turkish citizens enjoy the benefits of being part of a democratic country. Therefore, the research question for the study is whether the Turkish hybrid competitive authoritarian regime tampers with the democratic practices of the military, electoral practices, the media, and individual rights and freedoms while relying on Schmitter and Karl’s (n.a) the meaning of democracy as a system of power in which leaders are held responsible for their actions in the public sphere by citizens, acting indirectly through the rivalry and collaboration of their leaders. It argues that the authoritarian leadership under AKP is detrimental to the attempts to develop a democratic state where other groups have an equal chance to express their views regarding how political activities ought to happen in the country.

Describing a Hybrid Competitive Authoritarian Regime

A hybrid competitive authoritarian regime resembles a two-sided coin. On the one side, the system practices liberal acts such as eradicating tutelary powers, championing for civil freedom and independence, fair political activities, fair elections, and alleviation of universal suffrage. However, the other side depicts characteristics of an authoritarian government whereby cases of unfair electoral practices take place, unequal political practices, and contravention of civil rights and freedoms are rampant. Cameron (2018) describes a competitive regime as civil powers whereby politicians take advantage of democratic institutions to ascend into power. The groups and individuals handling public facilities and state organizations have a improved place and benefit over their challengers. Thus, the government becomes increasingly competitive towards the opposition, which also takes advantage of democratic facilities and avenues to struggle for power (Dhal 1971). Nonetheless, this does not give the opposition an equal chance to compete because the government has a better chance to utilize the available resources for its benefit. In other words, competition exists in the political arena, but in an unfair way (Hunter and Power, 2019). Turkey is an example of a country that uses a hybrid competitive authoritarian regime because the political scene in the country is a combination of both authoritarian features and liberal practices. Like other hybrid settings, Turkey is like a two-sided coin, where liberal deeds and thoughts and practices exist together with actions and deeds that have nothing to do with what many would term as a contemporary liberal political system (Stelgias, 2016). The competitive authoritarian state in Turkey resembles what O’Donnell (1994) describes as a delegative democracy, which rests on the premise that anyone who wins the presidency gets the power to govern the country as he or she finds appropriate. The president in a delegative democracy, just as it happens in Turkey, becomes the main custodian of the country and the definer of its interests (O’Donnell 1994). Consequently, the hybrid competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey has resulted in the suppression of non-elected tutelary powers, such as monarchy, media, military groups, and religious institutions, which have the capacity to restrict the administered by the state. The situation has remained the same in Turkey since 2007.

Impact of the Hybrid Regime on Democracy

Effects on the Military

The attempts by the AKP to suppress the military is a perfect example of how the government and its leaders can interfere with the attempts to build a democratic society whereby every person enjoys their liberty without any fears or threats. Since its ascension to power, the governments under the AKP political umbrella have sought to suppress the impact of the Turkish military in political activities (Stelgias, 2016). To achieve this goal, the AKP came up with a series of institutional and political changes. The transformations eliminated all forms of de facto powers, including military mafias and that act with impunity in opposition to the state’s blockage liberal practices (Cameron 2018). From 2003-2007 following a series of reformed initiated by the European Union, the military in Turkey has lost its rightful institutional powers and mechanisms, such as the MGK (Milli Guvenlik Konseyi) also called the National Security Council (Stelgias, 2016). Besides, since 2007, following the trials of Balyoz and Ergenok, the non-institutional or informal mechanisms attached to the military such as the capacity to give press briefings and public speeches as a way of contributing towards political activities and express its desires, which was practice in the past has disappeared (Stelgias, 2016). At the same time, the Turkish armed forces has lost its ability to arbitrate in times of threats, such as those generated by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Moreover, the 2010 constitutional amendments deprived the military of its institutional power, because the changes further diminished the jurisdiction and powers of military courts, and removed the military’s right to perform internal security activities without the permission of civil powers, and improved auditing in military spending (Stelgias, 2016). The situation in Turkey is different with the situation in Brazil during Rousseff’s reign when the military gain unrestricted powers to dictate national activities (Hunter and Power 2019). In addition, the AKP rule a few years ago made alterations to Article 35 of the Internal Service Law, which originally allowed the armed forces to intercede during threats, thereby making the force unable to offer their services effectively during such threatening situations.  

Impact on Electoral Processes

On one side of the coin, Turkey appears to enjoy a reasonably fair level of competitiveness between the opposition and the government. The parliamentary and presidential elections conducted in modern Turkey in 2011 and 2014, respectively, are excellent illustrations of the realistically fair political activities between the two sides (Stelgias, 2016). The AKP emerged the victor in the 2011 elections with nearly 50% of the votes casted followed by the RPP, and then NAP, which performed slightly poorly compared to 2007 (Stelgias, 2016). In the new parliament that accommodates 550 members of parliament, the almost thirty six independent members of parliament enjoying the support of the Peace and Democracy Party had the chance to compose a parliamentary group. It happened that the turnout in the 2011 presidential elections was higher compared to 2007 (Stelgias, 2016). At least 78 (14.2%) out of the 550 MPs elected in 2011 were females, while AKP secured 45 seats, CHP 19, BDP 11, and MHP 3 (Stelgias, 2016). After three years, in 2014, Prime Minister and AKP’s head, Recap Erdogan, ascended to power as the first directly elected leader of the Republic of Turkey. Erdogan secured approximately 52% of the votes casted, so there was no need for a run-off (Stelgias, 2016). Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu who had served as the General Secretary of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation who was chosen to present 13 opposition parties that joined to form a coalition, garnered 39% of the votes, while Selahattin Demirtas of HDP who received the backing of eight left-wing political parties, assumed the third position with approximately 10% of the votes (Stelgias, 2016). The last two Turkish elections depict the existence of a reasonably fair situation of elections and race between the government and the opposition in contemporary Turkey.

Nonetheless, the vital measures adopted to achieve democratization, the absence of non-elected tutelary authorities, some fair level of political activities, free elections, and protection of individual liberties only form one part of Turkey. Evidence suggests that today, the country experiences considerable challenges in its electoral practices (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Even outsiders may perceive the electoral processes in Turkey to be free and fair, some actions cast significant doubt on the fairness of the process. The Turkish constitution directs that in order to achieve parliamentary threshold, a party must fairly win most of the seats. Another worrying challenge is that political groups are forbidden from forming any kind of organization, establishments, or coalitions. It also emerges that in the past recent years, the leading party (AKP) and the opposition made clear their misunderstanding with the undemocratic constitutional features (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Despite the disturbing disagreements and the initiatives to make necessary adjustments, the AKP, which is in charge of state affairs has not adopted any measure to adjust or change the controversial provisions (Yılmaz and Bryan, 2019). Also, the body that regulates elections makes it difficult for the opposition to make any election appeals during general elections. Stelgias (2016) explains that based on the official number of the Supreme Election Board, the number of registered voters increased by 1.02% between 2002 and 2007. However, it is astonishing that the total number of registered voters between 2007 and 2014 went high by 29% (Stelgias, 2016). It was even more confusing that Turkey’s population went high by 10% between 2007 and 2014 (Stelgias, 2016). However, the truth is that although the population of Turkey has expanded steadily over the years the number of voters signals inexplicably sharp contrasts.

The presidential elections held in 2014 is a perfect illustration of the unfair political competition in the country. The opposition side blamed the AKP of utilizing its powers unfairly to deny all sides equal political time before the presidential elections held in 2014 (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights confirmed the claims by reporting that while the team supporting Prime Minister Erdogan enjoyed state resources and unrestricted movement across the country, the activities of the opposition and the public promotion of candidates in the opposing side were restricted (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Erdogan appeared to use strategy that many leaders in delegative democracies use whereby they promise to be courageous and strong in the way they suppress electoral injustice only to dash people’s hopes once they ascend to power (O’Donnell 1994). Such harsh regulations and unmatched practices indicates how the hybrid competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey affect electoral practices.

Impact on the Media

The hybrid competitive authoritarian regime has adverse implication on media sources, which deny operators in this sector the chance to express their views in a way that castigates the undemocratic practices of the AKP leadership. Despite clear provisions in the constitution, the freedom of press in Turkey has progressively depreciated from 2010. The realizations by ODIHR reveals that the demanding government places stiffer limitations on liberty of media, including as well as restrict the use of the Internet. The report expresses worries that intrusions by political leaders have thwarted media autonomy. The AKP has failed to enact features to protect the impartiality of broadcasters, especially during electoral processes. That was the situation in 2014 when Erdogan and his team restricted media houses, including the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). Chirica (2017) and Levitsky and Way (2002) informs that ever since the start of the initial term in 2002, the AKP has been manipulating the media with the aim of curtailing and circumventing independent journalism in the country . Chirica (2017) refers to the suppression of media freedom in the country for the last one and a half decade as a democratic regression in the country. Rather than promoting an independent and sure space for its press, the AKP government has established an environment that is antagonistic and even intimidating for journalists to give reports on contradicting perceptions. Besides, the disorderly state proceedings towards news media receive the backing of Prime Minister Erdogan, who is now the country’s president. The leader continuously establishes a powerful and intimidating media autocracy that deny the media the freedom to report information touching on the country’s leadership, especially when it has to do with electoral processes. Over the years, the now president of Turkey has formed a habit of castigating the media at least each week in the General Assembly during his televised speeches. Whatever matter was on top of the agenda in the country. The president always expressed his displeasure with the media, targeting media owners and individual columnists alike. He even sometimes attacked international media groups. For example, during his second term in power, Erdogan vehemently condemned Reuters, BBC, and CNN for the coverage of the demonstrations against the grabbing of Gezi Park.

Over the years, the AKP government held its control over the media by outlawing media groups that criticized the government. The violators were either suspended for indefinite period, or resold to organizations that supported the ideologies of the AKP and Erdogan. In turn, Erdogan and his government offered satisfying rewards to these supportive firms by offering them long-term state contracts. Some of the dominant media houses that benefitted from the state’s rewards, include the Dogan Media Group and the Sabah-ATV that developed propaganda apparatus to promote AKP, and to silence the voices and opinions of the opposition. In a speech that Erdogan made on June 6, 3013, Erdogan did not appear to be moved by the ongoing violent demonstrations, and instead responded to journalists in a rude way. Protesters seized the moment during the Gezi protests to express their displeasure in the state censorship of the media. Even though television stations such as NTV and CNN Turk took the risk to relay news that express negative thoughts about the government, some of their leaders and senior employees have since resigned or left the country for fear of being apprehended and detained.

Interference with Civil Liberty

The government under AKP chooses to avoid the other side of the coin, which is related to the contravention of civil practices, unbalanced political competition, and massive malpractices in electoral processes. For example, the AKP government ordered the policy to violently disperse groups of campaigners who held a peaceful protect in 2013 opposing the government’s plan to build a shopping mall in the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The government continuously and harshly clamped down protests, which depicts the government’s failure to safeguard human rights. The state was tough on peaceful demonstrators who expressed their displeasure with the way the AKP handled the turmoil in Syria in 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2020). An account by the Human Rights Watch (2020) showed the use of excessive force in suppressing the protestors is a sign that the AKP government does not pay much attention to protecting the rights and well-being of its people. It happened that security officers detained and charged hundreds of citizens taking part in the protests, chiefly in major cities such as Izmir, Ankara, and Istanbul (OECD, 2020). These people were charged with damaging properties, resisting the police, and unpermitted demonstrations. Several people were also accused of being part of terror groups, while almost 50 demonstrators were held in pretrial confinement several years after the protests.

Violation of freedom of speech is an example of how an authoritarian regime can interfere with civil liberty. Levitsky and Way (2002) write that Erdogan’s win in 2002 signaled a period of unmatched freedom for press in Turkey that had experienced constraints throughout history. The Justice and Development Party liberalized the press law, and enacted more fortification against state interference and promoting journalists’ rights to safeguard their sources. However, despite the transformations, true media diversity remains a major illusion. The media in Turkey cannot express its opinions as it desires, especially if it belongs to private owners (Levitsky & Way, 2002). For example, the media is at a risk of self-censorship if it reports any criticism against Erdogan’s family. Cases of violation of civil liberty were evident from 2007 when Turkey’s leader convicted hundreds of journalists, academics, and members of the judiciary for going against his directives (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Some were falsely accused of being members of the Ergenekon, which was an illicit group blamed for planning the attempted coup against Erdogan (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Such violations of civil liberty illustrates how an authoritarian regime may go against the attempts to build a democratic society.

Discussion

The incidents in Turkey and the leadership approaches provides clear information regarding the possible implications of failing to protect the democratic rights of all citizens. Leaders should create a democratic system where elected leaders do not take sole decisions, and regard everyone as being part of the system (Anria, 2016; Schumpeter, 2003). It is imperative for the national leaders in Turkey to advocate for democratic practices because Dhal (1971) and Dahl (1970) argues that for a government to have the chance to be responsive for a long duration, and to be able to serve its citizens better, all citizens, regardless of their status, should have unhindered opportunities to formulate and express their preferences, signify their views and interests to their fellow citizens and the government, and have their desires determined equally by the government. Furthermore, it is important to promote democracy because people in a democratic state are happier, healthier, learned, and have a better chance of achieving their economic aspirations (Roser, 2019). However, Turkey may not achieve these requirements unless it strives to achieve complete democracy and its leaders change their perception towards engaging various groups, including the military (Sen, 1999).

Above all, the AKP should acknowledge that a free press is important to any democracy, encouraging constructive public engagement, while also holding the state accountable. The media, according to Levitsky and Way (2002), are usually a fundamental aspect of debate in competitive authoritarian regimes. The state should enact measures to avoid being viewed as a full-blown autocracy where the government entirely owns media activities, systematically represses its activities, or heavily censor its content (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Rather than owning and controlling the leading TV and radio stations, or restraining their operation under the directives of close allies, the government should encourage privatization of media operations and encourage autonomy (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Administrators should not forbid by law magazines and newspapers as it happens in countries such as Turkmenistan, Cuba, and Uzbekistan, and should not instill fear into journalists who go against the government’s directives (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Instead, leaders should promote independent media, and acknowledge that autonomous outlets often serve a vital watchdog functions by investigating and exposing government malpractice.

Conclusion

The hybrid competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey is a major obstacle to democratic processes in the country. The tough measures placed the leaders of AKP deny the military the right to air their views on political matters, and temper with electoral processes. Turkey presents itself as being fair during elections, but this is usually not the case. The tough political regulations by the AKP affect the freedom of the media, and journalists and media houses that contravene the regulations set the Erdogan and his government face significant risks. Also, the tough stand by the AKP denies individuals their civil rights such as demonstrating against bad deeds and unfair political practices. Turkey and its political leaders should reconsider their stand about allowing their various groups their democratic rights to achieve a country where people do not live in constant fear and uncertainty.

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