Compatibility of Trump’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Rules Governing the Use of Force in International Law

Posted: January 5th, 2023

Compatibility of Trump’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Rules Governing the Use of Force in International Law

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Compatibility of Trump’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Rules Governing the Use of Force in International Law

Introduction

The application of force is a legally undetermined and politically sensitive matter. It is, therefore, not astonishing that it forms part of a highly controversial matter. Andrew Garwood-Gowers who reviews the work by Christian Henderson describes how many nations would still refer to the concept of jus ad bellum when justifying their use of military power to address conflicts, a situation that makes it difficult to reduce or minimize the use of violence.[1] The controversies did not go away in the 1990s because a country like Yugoslavia continued to experience similar incidences during a better part of the period. The use of force did not go down during the 2000s and 2010s because cases of forceful invasion were reported in countries such as Ukraine, Syria, Georgia, Iraq, and Lebanon among other nations. The paper addresses the violations of the provisions of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter by former U.S. President Donald Trump. The Article has received overwhelming support from member countries because it allows parties to run their internal affairs without forceful external interference. Kofi Annan who served as the UN Secretary-General in 2003 when conflicts were rampant in Iraq wrote that “no regulation of the UN Charter is more fundamental than the directive of the non-use of forceful involvement as enshrined in the fourth paragraph of Article 2”.[2] Annan stated that the UN leaders, including Secretary-Generals encounter many constraints in the course of their duties but the hurdle that tests their capacity to lead the organisation entails the application of force.[3] The report relies on the 2019 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, which outline the core objectives and principles of the UN Charter. It illustrates that Trump’s foreign policy goes against the directives of Article 2 (4) of the Charter in the way he applies force in handling the internal affairs of other independent states.

Rules Governing the Use of Force in International Law

Article 2, paragraph 4 (Prohibition of the Threat or use of Force) forbids states from using forceful means against other territories.[4] The UN Charter makes it clear that “all affiliates shall refrain in the international relations (IR) from the threat or application of force against the regional integrity or political autonomous of any country, or in any other way inconsistent with the objectives of the UN”.[5][6] During the 2019 review, the UN Security Council did not adopt any new decisions with regard to Article 2 (4).[7] In most of its rulings, nevertheless, the Council underscored the regulations of Article 2 (4) by; reaffirming the ban of the threat or utilisation of force in IR, reinstating the significance of non-disturbance by states and good-neighbourliness in the internal activities of others, advocating for the halting of aid by states to armed groups participating in weakening regional and national security and peace, and calling on members to evacuate all military groups from a disputed location or territories.

Reinstatement of Ban of the Use of Force in IR

The Council affirmed in 2019 the forbidding of the threat or application of force against other members through some of its decisions, especially those regarding the situation in the Middle East and the status of Abyei. The UN Secretary-General on his report on case of Sudan and South Sudan declared through Resolution of 2019 that the territorial borders of states shall not be interfered with through forceful means, and that any territorial misunderstandings shall be handled wholly through peaceful techniques. The Secretary-General through Resolution 2477 of 2019 regarding the situation in the Middle East reaffirmed that both sides must follow the directives of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement developed in 1974 between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel and carefully abide by the terms of the ceasefire. The obligation to observe the 1974 regulation requires state to practice maximum restraint and avoid aby violations of the ceasefire and the place of separation.

Calls Upon Members to Remove All Military Forces

The Council during its 2019 review session asked the government of Israel to hasten the removal of its army from Ghajar, which borders Israel and Lebanon. Hussain and Jahanzaib who examine the effects of removal of foreign military troops from Afghanistan beginning 2014 using qualitative methods find that the withdrawal fosters good relationship between the involved countries, especially the governing party and the side being governed. The removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan that commenced on July 2011 with the target of removing 23,000 American fighters has restored confidence in the country’s autonomy, and encouraged the Afghan security forces to take charge of its security matters.[8] However, withdrawal of military troops can have adverse economic effects, especially the foreigners play vital roles in supporting the economy as with the case of Afghanistan. Hussain and Jahanzaib describe how Afghanistan underwent considerable economic constraints after the removal of foreign military groups because the foreign states acted as vital sources of financial aid for Kabul.[9] Many experts feared whether the country could gain financial stability before its entire economy collapses. Nonetheless, the fear and apprehension associated with deploying solders in occupied territories.

Constitutional Discussions Regarding Article 2 (4)

Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter was overtly mentioned ten times during five meetings held by the Council. Furthermore, Article 2 was widely mentioned in one of the Council conventions while paying much attention to the guidelines indicated in Article 2 (4). During the 8461^st convention held on February 2019 in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the diplomat from South Africa said that, having listened to the submissions on the matter of Ukraine, he thought members of the Council would take practical actions also in the context of the condition in Venezuela, encompassing showing reverence to the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Venezuela, following the principles of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, and avoiding aggression against other affiliates of the UN. Scenarios one through 3 below, are some of the deliberations of the UN Council concerning the application of Article 2 (4) in different jurisdictions;

Case One – The situation in Venezuela

During the 8454nd convention conducted in January 2019, upon the request of the U.S., the Security Council held a discussion on the issue of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”. Russia had opposed the happening of the meeting arguing that the U.S. had violated the provisions of Article 2 (4), and that Americans should be liable for interfering with international peace and security.[10] During the meeting, most participants agreed on the importance of handling the situation in Venezuela using peaceful means, while adhering to the directives of non-disturbance and non-application of force in the country’s internal affairs.[11] Equatorial Guinea, for example, argued that using extreme approaches, violence, and external interference would only worsen the situation. Representative of the Russian Federation also blamed the U.S. of having ill intention of taking advantage of the meeting as an avenue to conduct changes in the regime of Venezuela, and for interference in such a way that their practices go against the directives of Article 2 (4).[12] Russia thought that the U.S. had the intention to apply force on Venezuela through its claim that it will consider all the available options on the table, and that America could possible deploy military officers to handle the Venezuelan situation. Russia and other like-minded nations called on the U.S. to show respect and to refrain from interfering with the domestic issues of the South American country. The other countries that supported the need for upholding sovereignty, integrity, and sovereignty while handling the situation in Venezuela, include Indonesia, Cuba, and Antigua and Barbuda among others.[13]

Case Two – Situation in the Middle East

The UN Council held the 8495^th meeting on March 2019 to examine a report by the Secretary General on UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), in response to the claim by the U.S. on March 2019, acknowledging the sovereignty of Israel over its occupation of Syrian Golan. The U.S. representative held that its declaration neither tampers with the provisions of UNDOF nor goes against the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974. The U.S. also reiterated that the ruling was of significant importance with regarding to improving the level of security in Israel, adding that America was confident the move would boost stability by stopping the utilisation of the Golan Heights as a place for launching missiles targeted against Israelites.[14] However, the representative of Germany while pointing out that the interests of security did not warrant annexation, acknowledged that the availability of solders of Iranian-affiliated solders and Syrian regime around the border contravened the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and amounted to a threat against Israel and should cease. The representative of Kuwait while presenting his ideas argued that the Syrian Arab land of Golan was under the rule of Israel, and refused to support its annexation and occupation using forceful means, arguing that such practices went against the directives of the Charter, regulations of international law, and the applicable resolutions by the UN Security Council.[15] The UK also had a contradictory view from that of the U.S. claiming that it forceful annexation was forbidden under international law, including the UN Charter, and held that, under the directives of state obligation, member states were required not to acknowledge the annexation of territory as an outcome of applying forceful means.[16] The meeting, therefore, played important roles in showing the adverse implications of forceful means.

Case Three – Preservation of Global Peace and Security

Poland was the main reason the 8600^th meeting was conducted by the UN Security Council on August 2019. The title of the meeting “Maintenance of international peace and security”, sought to address the use of force in intervening in the affairs of other nations or regions.[17] The Chinese representative was the first to speak and during his submission, the diplomat expressed firm disagreement with the willful application or the threat of executing force and to external bullying, political practice, and intervention by external parties in mitigating the emerging concerns in the Middle East. China held strongly that the integrity, unity, independence, and sovereignty of the concerned states should be respected. A representative from the Dominican Republic expressed a similar view by contending that the territorial integrities of nations such as Libya, Yemen, and Syria were under substantial threat and that millions of vulnerable populations had been pushed out of their homes and countries.[18] Russian Federation representative echoed the sentiments by declaring that no one-sided action of any nature could address either the new or protracted issues facing the Middle East and the entire Arab world. Russia suggested that the initiative by some parties to delegitimize other countries and weaken and overthrow administrations that some capitals perceive inappropriate and has formed more complications for the region. The officials from Equatorial Guinea and the Syrian Arab Republic expressed similar views regarding use of forceful means to indulge in the affairs of other member states. For example, the representative of Equatorial Guinea showed his country’s concern on the issue of changes in regime policies and in the intervention and interference of the domestic issues of other autonomous countries. The Syrian representative, on the other hand, blamed some members of the Council for derailing the realisation of the causes of forceful indulgence and harmful external indulgence in the affairs of countries in the Middle East. These and other submissions during the meeting affirms how forceful interruption of the affairs of other states attract criticism and condemnation.

Examining Trump’s Policy in Light of Article 2 (4)

From his initial days on the campaign trails in 2016, outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump made his intentions on foreign policy clear to everyone by declaring that his leadership would put the interests of America first.[19] Now, after almost four years of Trump’s reign, his promise has been come out with facts and supporting events. A report by Duetsche Welle shows how the leader’s term was marked by confrontations and unilateralism with regard to the formation of foreign policy, as have confusion, surprises, and employee turnover.[20] Regardless of the results of the U.S. federal election on 3 November, 2020, the transformations under Trump in both policy formation and implementation have altered the environment in which other global players engage in diplomatic relations, as well as their own techniques.

Trump showed lack of interest in international cooperation and his defiance did not take long to manifest after assuming power on January 20, 2017. Findings by Duetsche Welle reveal how a mere three days into his leadership, he led the U.S. out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact with Asian countries. He again removed the U.S. out of other many global agreements and organisations, such as the Paris climate accord of 2015 and the United Nations Human Rights Council.[21] The President also opposed the ideologies of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and opposed the efforts by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to combat the COVID 19 outbreak. He also had contradicting views to the Treaty on Open Skies that permits reconnaissance flights over the military installations of other nations, and on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that outlawed land-based nuclear missiles.[22] Margaret MacMillan who lectures both in the University of Oxford and the University of Toronto believes that the Trump’s administration has interfered with what was an important network of collaboration and puts America in a much weaker position in terms of international alliances and other global affairs.[23]

An evident scenario in Trump’s foreign policy is that he advocated for the use of force in handling the affairs of other sovereign countries, which is contrary to the directives of Article 2 (4). An examination of the four cases that the UN Council handled in 2019 reveals that the U.S., under Trump’s leadership, forcefully interfered with the internal affairs of other countries in three cases. In case one (the situation in Venezuela), various member states attending the 26 January 2019 meeting convened by the Security Council castigated U.S.’s approach towards the happenings in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Russia feels that Trump’s approach towards the incident in Venezuela is a form of a coup d’etat and thinks that the approach contravenes the provisions of Article 2 (4).[24] Russia feels that it is wrong for the U.S. to plan for a regime change in Venezuela yet the country has the capacity to run its affairs, or it is possible to use other inclusive means to address the matter. Russia urged the UN Secretary of State to clarify whether it would permit the U.S. to deploy military officers to the people of Venezuela, a move that could contradict the directives of Article 2 (4).[25] Venezuelans feel that the U.S. is a major threat to its sovereignty because other than planning a coup d’etat, the western nation dictates orders to the opposition in Venezuela and satellite governments in the region, thus acting contrary to the requirements of international law. Wesrwood and Cole who report for the CNN describes how Trump declared that his plan for use of U.S. Army in Venezuela was still feasible amid the ongoing political turmoil.[26] The President refused to hold talks with Nicolas Maduro (the President of Venezuela), which heightened tensions on the grounds under which Trump wanted to deploy the military forces. Margaret Brennan who works for CBS had the chance to interview President Trump, but did not get a clear and direct response from him about why he would deploy the officers to Venezuela.[27] When Brennan wanted to know what would push the leader to send military troops in the South American country and what the national benefit of such a move would be, Trump said he does not want to comment on that, but it is one of the options he considers as being suitable. The Trump leadership had placed sanctions actions against Petroleum of Venezuela, commonly abbreviated as PDVSA, which is the leading state-owned oil firm in the country and a major source of state revenue, a move which further crippled activities and attempts to end the stalemate in the country.[28] Trump’s approach in the case of Venezuela clearly indicates that his foreign policy does not consider the directives of Article 2 (4) that forbids that application of force when engaging in the affairs of autonomous states.

Trump’s Policy on Iraq

Trump has continued to use excessive force on Iraq, which further depicts his violation of Article 2 (4). The killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq earlier in 2020 is an indication of Trump’s use of force contrary to the directives of the UN Charter. Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, announced in January that Trump and his security team are embarking on real deterrence, which entails instilling fears onto its targets.[29] It is projected that the announcement could cause more tensions between the U.S., Iraq, and other countries that oppose the use of force. Nevertheless, it might be too late for Trump to consider ceasing use of force in some independent territories. Ryan et al. describe how the Trump administration plans to move ahead with a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan before the President leaves office in January 2021, taking measures towards fulfilling his-long postponed campaign promise to withdraw troops from warzones.[30] Sources indicate that the President plans to bring back between 2500 and 5000 U.S. solders by the time Joe Biden will be taking office in January 2021. The administration is also projected to come up with a more modest plan to reduce troops in Iraq, lowering the number of troops from 3000 to approximately 2500, another practice that would improve the objective Trump has shown since he was elected as the national leader. Trump had ordered for the reduction by half the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan.[31]

Trump’s Tweet to Rouhani

Trump’s response to the remarks of President Hassan Rouhani of Iran through a tweet only displayed how the outgoing U.S. President prefer the use of force to other approaches of settling differences. Trump through a tweet on 23 July 2018 warned Iran against threatening the U.S.; otherwise, Iran would suffer adverse repercussions.[32] The President again tweeted asking Iranians to be cautious because America will no longer withstand its threats. Trump was reacting to the sentiments by Rouhani that a war with Iran would turn out to be grave and regrettable. Trump’s remarks have generated much controversy, including from Democrats who tweeted saying that the U.S. is not attacking Iran.[33] The harsh manner in which Trump handled the attack by the Iranian leader suggests that he values forceful means of handling differences with other countries.

Recommendations

The analysis of the directives of Article 2 (4), the attempts by various countries, including the U.S. to tamper with the internal affairs of other occupied territories using forceful means, and the escalating opposition on the use of force require the participating parties to consider taking more stern measures to combat the problem. First, all nations and their leaders should understand their obligations as enshrined in Article 2 (4). Member states should know that they must not act in a way that violates the purposes and objectives of the UN in suppressing the use of forceful means. Countries can develop their internal structures that are in line with the provisions of Article 2 (4) to guide them on refraining from forceful interference. The U.S. and Trump in particular learn important lessons on the use of force to settle foreign issues, and can use the information to improve their approach in mitigating similar incidences in future. In addition, the Secretary Council that has the mandate to determine the presence of, and take measures to mitigate, any violation to international security and peace, should eradicate any doubts in the way it handles forceful indulgence by taking appropriate measures to deal with reported cases. Already, a review of the 2019 meetings held by the Council to address adherence to the provisions of Article 2 (4) reveals how some nations feel that the Council is not doing enough to address violations by countries such as the U.S. and Israel. Unless the Council’s leadership takes appropriate measures to address the emerging concerns, it would be difficult to win the war against forceful indulgence in the affairs of autonomous territories. The failure would also breach global peace and stability.

Summary

The report illustrates how the actions of Trump as the leader of the U.S. contravened the directives of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter that forbids the use of force or threat of force when addressing the internal affairs of other independent states. Several meetings held by the UN Council in 2019 alone shows how several affiliates of the UN feel that the U.S. under Trump’s leadership violates the provisions of Article 2 (4), which require member states to practice caution in the way they engage in the affairs of other countries. The way Trump handled the case of Venezuela and his intention to deploy military forces, his attacks in Iraq, and his approach towards Iran evidently suggest that the leader defies Article 2 (4), and does not seem to acknowledge the potential adverse implications of his foreign policy.

References

Achim Wennmann, ‘Economic Dimensions of Armed Groups: Profiling the Financing, Costs, and Agendas and Their Implications for Mediated Engagements’ [2011] IREC 333, 335, 339 

Agata Kleczkowska, ‘When the Use of Force Is Prohibited – Article 2 (4) and the Threshold of the Use of Force’ 8 [2018] PPUAM 109, 110

Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Book Reviews: The Use of Force and International Law by Christian Henderson (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 440 Pages. Price Aud127.95 (Hardback) ISBN 9781107036345,’ 20 [2019] MJIL 1, 2

Bill Chappell, ‘Trump to Iran’s President Rouhani: ‘NEVER, EVER THREATEN’ the U.S. Again,’ (NPR, 23 July 2018) < https://www.npr.org/2018/07/23/631454795/trump-to-irans-president-never-ever-threaten-the-u-s-again > Accessed 27 December 2020

Brian Ellsworth, ‘Trump Says U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela ‘An Option;’ Russia Rejects,’ (Reuters, 3 February 2019) < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN1PS0DK> Accessed 27 December 2020

Christian Henderson, The Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2018), 149

Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments,’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020) <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/trumps-foreign-policy-moments> Accessed 27 December 2020

David Wippman, ‘The Nine Lives of Article 2(4)’ 16 [2007] MJIL 387, 390

Denijal Jegic, ‘Why Does the World Ignore Israeli Violations of Lebanese Sovereignty? (The World, 3 September 2020) < https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/why-does-the-world-ignore-israeli-violations-of-lebanese-sovereignty-39437> Accessed 27 December 2020

Duetsche Wella, ‘U.S. Election: How Donald Trump has Changed Global Foreign Policy,’ (Duetsche Wella, 24 October 2020) < https://www.dw.com/en/us-election-how-donald-trump-has-changed-global-foreign-policy/a-55194020> Accessed 27 December 2020

Ejaz Hussain and Muhammad Jahanzaib, ‘Afghanistan: The Western Withdrawal and its Implications for Security and Economy’ [2015] 1, 3

Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Trump Turns His ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign on Iraq,’ (The Washington Post, 29 September 2020) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/09/29/trump-iraq-embassy-iran-pompeo/> Accessed 27 December 2020

James Dobbins, Jason Campbell, Sean Mann and Laurel Miller, ‘Consequences of a Precipitous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, (Rand Cooperation, 2019) <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE326/RAND_PE326.pdf> Accessed 27 December 2020

John Becker, ‘The Continuing Relevance of Article 2(4): A Consideration of the Status of the U.N. Char Status of the U.N. Charter’s Limitations of the Use of F s Limitations of the Use of Force’ 32 [2004] DJIP 583, 584

Joshua Berlinger, ‘Trump Tweets Explosive Threat to Iran,’ (CNN, 23 July 2018) <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/23/politics/trump-iran-intl/index.html> Accessed 27 December 2020

Michael Wood, ‘International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens In Practice?’ 53 IJIL [2013] 345

Missy Ryan et al., ‘Trump Administration to Cut Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq in Sprint to Deliver on President’s Promise,’ (The Washington Post, 17 November 2020) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-afghan-war-troop-cuts/2020/11/16/6cc2655c-2827-11eb-b847-66c66ace1afb_story.html > Accessed 27 December 2020

Toi Staff and Agencies, ‘Lebanon to File UN Complaint on Israel Overflights During Alleged Syria Attacks,’ (The Times of Israel, 26 December 2018) <https://www.timesofisrael.com/lebanon-to-file-un-complaint-on-israeli-overflights-during-alleged-syria-strikes/> Accessed 27 December 2020

Sarah Westwood and Devan Cole, ‘Trump Says Use of Military Force in Venezuela is Still on the Table,’ (CNN, 3 February 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/03/politics/trump-nicolas-maduro-military-force/index.html> Accessed 27 December 2020

United Nations, ‘Part III: Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ (United Nations, 2019) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/22nd_supp_part_iii_advance_0.pdf#page=12> Accessed 27 December 2020, pp. 13, 17, 18, 27, 29, 30, 33,

United Nations, ‘UN Charter,’ (United Nations, 2020) < https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/> Accessed 27 December 2020

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[1] Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Book Reviews: The Use of Force and International Law by Christian Henderson (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 440 Pages. Price Aud127.95 (Hardback) ISBN 9781107036345,’ 20 [2019] MJIL 1,

[2] Michael Wood, ‘International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens In Practice?’ 53 IJIL [2013] 345

[3] Ibid, 345

[4] United Nations, ‘UN Charter,’ (United Nations, 2020) < https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/> accessed 27 December 2020

[5] John Becker, ‘The Continuing Relevance of Article 2(4): A Consideration of the Status of the U.N. Char Status of the U.N. Charter’s Limitations of the Use of F s Limitations of the Use of Force’ 32 [2004] DJIP 583, 584

[6] David Wippman, ‘The Nine Lives of Article 2(4)’ 16 [2007] MJIL 387, 390

[7] Agata Kleczkowska, ‘When the Use of Force Is Prohibited – Article 2 (4) and the Threshold of the Use of Force’ 8 [2018] PPUAM 109, 110

[8] Ejaz Hussain and Muhammad Jahanzaib, ‘Afghanistan: The Western Withdrawal and its Implications for Security and Economy’ [2015] 1, 3

[9] Ibid, 3

[10] United Nations, ‘Part III: Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ (United Nations, 2019) < https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/22nd_supp_part_iii_advance_0.pdf#page=12> accessed 27 December 2020

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid, 17

[13] Ibid, 18

[14] United Nations, ‘Part III: Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ (United Nations, 2019) < https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/22nd_supp_part_iii_advance_0.pdf#page=12> accessed 27 December 2020

[15] Ibid, 27

[16] United Nations, ‘Part III: Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ (United Nations, 2019) < https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/22nd_supp_part_iii_advance_0.pdf#page=12> accessed 27 December 2020

[17] Ibid, 29

[18] Ibid, 30

[19] Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments,’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020) <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/trumps-foreign-policy-moments> accessed 27 December 2020

[20] Duetsche Wella, ‘U.S. Election: How Donald Trump has Changed Global Foreign Policy,’ (Duetsche Wella, 24 October 2020) < https://www.dw.com/en/us-election-how-donald-trump-has-changed-global-foreign-policy/a-55194020> accessed 27 December 2020

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] United Nations, ‘Part III: Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,’ (United Nations, 2019) < https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/22nd_supp_part_iii_advance_0.pdf#page=12> accessed 27 December 2020

[25] Ibid, 17

[26] Sarah Westwood and Devan Cole, ‘Trump Says Use of Military Force in Venezuela is Still on the Table,’ (CNN, 3 February 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/03/politics/trump-nicolas-maduro-military-force/index.html> accessed 27 December 2020

[27] Ibid

[28] Brian Ellsworth, ‘Trump Says U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela ‘An Option;’ Russia Rejects,’ (Reuters, 3 February 2019) < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN1PS0DK> accessed 27 December 2020

[29] Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Trump Turns His ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign on Iraq,’ (The Washington Post, 29 September 2020) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/09/29/trump-iraq-embassy-iran-pompeo/> accessed 27 December 2020

[30] Missy Ryan et al., ‘Trump Administration to Cut Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq in Sprint to Deliver on President’s Promise,’ (The Washington Post, 17 November 2020) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-afghan-war-troop-cuts/2020/11/16/6cc2655c-2827-11eb-b847-66c66ace1afb_story.html > accessed 27 December 2020

[31] James Dobbins, Jason Campbell, Sean Mann and Laurel Miller, ‘Consequences of a Precipitous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, (Rand Cooperation, 2019) < https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE326/RAND_PE326.pdf> accessed 27 December 2020

[32] Joshua Berlinger, ‘Trump Tweets Explosive Threat to Iran,’ (CNN, 23 July 2018) < https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/23/politics/trump-iran-intl/index.html> accessed 27 December 2020

[33] Bill Chappell, ‘Trump to Iran’s President Rouhani: ‘NEVER, EVER THREATEN’ the U.S. Again,’ (NPR, 23 July 2018) < https://www.npr.org/2018/07/23/631454795/trump-to-irans-president-never-ever-threaten-the-u-s-again > accessed 27 December 2020