Abstract

Posted: January 4th, 2023

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Abstract

The coronavirus pandemic that is currently ravaging the world has activated the crisis management strategies of many nations. The United Arab Emirates has not been left behind, considering that it has suffered 253 fatalities as of 27 May and new cases continue to emerge daily. This study sought to assess the response of the UAE to the coronavirus pandemic from a crisis management perspective. The findings of the study revealed that the country was ahead of most of its neighbors, especially in its per capita testing rate, which was the highest in the world. In addition, the country had implemented stringent measures, such as lockdowns, night curfews, and steep fines, along with public sterilization programs. Moreover, the country has assisted China with medical suppliers when the country was worst hit by the pandemic as well as collaborated with its neighbors to keep supply chains functional. However, despite having learnt its lessons from the MERS epidemic that inspired increased emergency preparedness against pandemics, the country could do more to enhance its resilience and preparedness in future. Consequently, it was recommended that the country enhances its local, regional, and global collaboration to enhance surveillance, information and technology sharing, and capacity building. The country should also support the WHO financially to plug the gap from the imminent withdrawal of United States’ support.  In addition, the government should improve the living conditions of the migrant workers, who were most vulnerable to spreading infectious diseases due to congestion. Moreover, it was recommended that the government takes such crises as threats to its national security, and therefore, broaden its crisis management approaches to provide a wholesome attention to future crises.

Table of Contents

Contents                                                                                                                      Pages

Abstract 1

1.0 Introduction. 6

1.1 Background. 6

1.2 Research Aim, Questions, and Objectives. 6

1.2.1 Research aim.. 6

1.2.2 Research questions. 7

1.2.3 The objectives of the study. 7

1.3 Justification of the Study. 7

2.0 Literature review.. 9

2.1 Introduction. 9

2.2.1 Definitions of Crises and Crisis Management 9

2.2.2 GHP model of crisis management 12

2.2.3 Chaos Theory. 12

2.2.4 Butterfly theory of Crisis Management 13

2.2.5 Black Swan Theory. 13

2.2.6 Diffusion of Innovation Theory. 14

2.2.7 Structural-functional systems theory. 15

2.2.8 Unequal human capital theory. 15

2.2.9 Summary of theoretical foundations and their application to the coronavirus pandemic  15

2.3 Historical Background of Pandemics and their Related Crises. 17

2.3.1 Black Plague. 18

2.3.2 The Spanish flu. 20

2.3.3 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 20

2.3.4 Chemical and Biological Warfare. 21

2.4 Critical Review of Existing Literature. 22

2.4.1 National and Foreign Policy during Pandemics. 22

2.4.2 Coronavirus Pandemic. 24

2.5 Gaps in Previous Studies. 29

3.0 Methodology. 31

3.1 Research Method. 31

3.2 Study Setting. 31

3.3 Data Collection. 31

3.4 Data Analysis. 32

4.0 Results. 32

4.1 Prevalence and Severity of the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United Arab Emirates. 32

4.2 Impact of Covid-19 pandemic in UAE.. 34

4.3 Interventions by the Government of UAE.. 34

4.3.1 Government Policies and Agencies. 34

4.3.2 Movement Control 35

4.3.3 Testing, quarantine, and isolation. 35

4.3.4 Sanitation. 36

4.3.5 Communication. 37

4.3.5 Law Enforcement 39

5.0 Discussion. 39

5.1 Challenges in the United Arab Emirates Interventions. 39

5.2 Lessons UAE can learn from Other Countries. 40

5.3 Lessons that UAE can Teach Other Countries. 45

5.4 Implications of the Coronavirus Pandemic in Crisis Management in the UAE.. 47

6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations. 49

6.1 Conclusions. 49

6.2 Recommendations. 51

Works Cited. 56

Crisis Management: Assessing UAE’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic

1.0 Introduction                                 

1.1 Background

Crises that escalate to a global level are worrisome, despite their rarity. Most crisis management strategies are designed to address organizational crises, and are well supported by theoretical models and frameworks. However, global crises are troublesome and challenging because of their enormous complexity, disparate effects on diverse countries, and far-reaching ramification to the normal way of life for large sections of the global population. The world has experienced few crises that have escalated to global proportions, namely, economic crises such as the Great Depression, and health crises like the Black Plague pandemic.  

Humankind has experienced several pandemics that have shaped the history of civilization by decimating large populations, and changing the way people behave and live. Unlike the Great Depression of the 1930 and the Great Financial Recession of 2007, which devastated national economies across the world, infectious disease pandemics are more feared for the huge fatalities they can cause if not controlled promptly and effectively. In this regard, outbreaks of infectious diseases are formidable risks that can be severe enough to cause global crises when they infect and kill many people fast and cause economic catastrophes, which change people’s way of life irreversibly across the world. From a positive perspective, they also spur scientific development, especially in public health, which enhances the resilience of people and the preparedness of nations all over the world.  

1.2 Research Aim, Questions, and Objectives

1.2.1 Research aim

Many countries around the world have had to institute measures to combat the spread of covid-19 disease and save the lives of their citizenry, with varied levels of success and challenges. In this respect, this study aims at assessing the response of the United Arab Emirates towards the coronavirus pandemic.

1.2.2 Research questions

The questions to be answered are:

  1. What has the United Arab Emirates done to address the coronavirus pandemic?
  2.  How effective has been the interventions by the United Arab Emirates in controlling the coronavirus pandemic?  

1.2.3 The objectives of the study

To answer these questions, the objectives of the study are:

  1. To determine the severity of the coronavirus pandemic in the United Arab Emirates
  2.  To identify the actions that have been undertaken by the United Arab Emirates government in addressing the coronavirus pandemic
  3. To assess how effective the interventions in the United Arab Emirates have been in containing the coronavirus pandemic
  4. To identify the challenges that the United Arab Emirates has experienced when addressing the coronavirus pandemic
  5. To identify the lessons about crisis management that the United Arab Emirates can learn from countries that have successfully addressed the coronavirus pandemic
  6. To recommend the improvements in crisis management practices of the United Arab Emirates that are required to make the country more resilient against pandemics in the future

1.3 Justification of the Study

Pandemics often erupt in an unprecedented manner, thus finding many societies, nations, and governments unprepared. Moreover, the rate of spread of pandemics often outpaces the implementation of interventions and places heavy burdens on the healthcare sector, the policymakers, scientists, and citizens. People across the world can pay a heavy price with unprecedented levels of fatalities, while national economies can be eroded, taking extended periods to recover since the infectious diseases can linger in society for long before effective vaccines and cures are developed. Countries expend huge resources towards interventions that would reduce the vagaries of the infectious disease and eliminate it all together, to enable people resume their normal lives as quickly as possible.

Usually, countries that have previous experiences with pandemics are better positioned to learn, improve their preparedness, and build resilience against similar occurrences in future. The Middle East has experienced several disease epidemics, with the most recent ones being the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and H1N1. These events have incentivized the governments in the Middle East countries to build resilience to secure their countries from future epidemics. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates has seen the detriments that chemical and biological warfare can deliver to unsuspecting masses of people in Syria and Iraq, who are close neighbors. Therefore, the weaponization of pathogens and chemicals by hostile neighbors is of concern to the United Arab Emirates.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic is the most recent public health crisis to confront the United Arab Emirates, having brought its economy to a near standstill, just like in the rest of the world. The government of the United Arab Emirates has taken measures to reduce the spread of covid-19 disease among its citizens. As of 26th May 2020, the country had experienced 1253 fatalities with 31,086 positive cases having been identified from the over 2 million people tested. Over 750 new infections are still being detected although the daily death rate has reduced to below 5 from a high of over 10 people, indicating that the disease is still spreading in the country. Therefore, it is critical and urgent that the effectiveness of the country’s response be assessed to identify how the interventions can be improved to lower the number of new infections and fatalities, which has incentivized this study.  

2.0 Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the information from literature that has been published in the last 10 years. The review discusses the literature thematically to provide a broad perspective of the issues associated with pandemics and other public health emergencies that require crisis management interventions because of their devastating consequences. The chapter also discusses the theoretical foundations and frameworks that underpin this study. In turn, it also highlights the gaps in the existing literature that necessitated this study. The review of existing literature is divided into the sources dedicated to the theories of crisis management, the historical background of pandemics and the crises they presented, a critical review of existing empirical studies that address crisis management during pandemics, and the research gaps exposed in the literature.

2.2 Theoretical Foundations of the Study

2.2.1 Definitions of Crises and Crisis Management

Several definitions of crises have been advanced and recorded in literature. For instance, Lin (601) describes crises as “novel, unpredictable, and are even characterized as chaotic events that require deliberate and immediate responses”. Similarly, Johansson and Härenstam (S260) define crises as situations emanating from the failure of protective and preparation actions and approaches to avert unwanted events from happening. They add that actors perceive crises as situations that affects and threatens the core values and basics of society acutely, that are characterized by urgency and uncertainty, and which have insufficient time for making decisions. Likewise, Booth (86) defines a crisis as a situation that presented difficulties in coping through the use of “normal routine procedures” thus creates stress due to the sudden changes to individuals, groups, or organizations. (Drennan, McConnell, and Stark (2) look at a crisis as “a set of circumstances” that threaten individuals, organizations and society to levels beyond the functioning norms in routine daily activities. However, they also noted that the implication and influence of these situations are diverse because they differ along individual perceptions. In turn, Coombs defines a crisis as a “significant threat of operations” that can produce adverse consequences when it is not addressed properly (Holla, Ristvej, and Titko 2268).

Drennan, McConnell, and Stark (15) observe that crises have diverse definitions based on different schools of though. The three main schools of thought include the objective, subjective, and realist schools. In the same vein, Booth (88) came up with three types of crises, which are creeping crises, routinized crises, and a sudden unexpected threat or loss. He goes on to give the psychological and political economy perspectives of crises (Booth 91). In turn, Juneja lists 11 different types of crises, which include, i) smoldering crisis, ii) sudden crisis, iii) crisis due to natural occurrences, iv) bankruptcy, v) crisis due to rumors, vi)  due to violence in the workplace, vii) crisis due to misdeeds in an organization, viii) crisis of malevolence, ix) confrontation crisis, x) technological crisis, and xi) natural crisis.  All in all, despite the diverse meanings associated with the term crisis, Holla, Ristvej, and Titko (205) observed that crisis situations have six common characteristics, which include the involvement of high stakes, urgency, ambiguity, having a high impact, significance, and rarity.

Risk is a concept that is closely related to a crisis. The international organization of standards (ISO) defines risk as a “combination of the probability of an event and its consequences” (Drennan, McConnell, and Stark 3). Drennan, McConnell, and Stark (4) continue by noting that risks are characterized by ambiguity and definitional difficulty, and the multiplicity of outcomes, which can be positive or negative. Risks that occur and escalate beyond manageable levels precipitate into crises. Wallig observed that a risk-crisis continuum links risks and crises in organizations, which can be explained using the risk-crisis integrated model, as illustrated in figure 1.

Figure 1. The variation of enterprise value and risk level

Source: Wallig

According to the risk-crisis integrated model, organizations manage risks that minimally affect the enterprise value easily. Therefore, organizations have risk tolerances that reflect their risk management effectiveness and are consistent with their risk optimization point because they present the highest influence on the enterprise value. However, risk tolerance can be exceeded by some risks, sending a firm to its flash point, when a crisis occurs (Wallig). . 

Crisis management is the ‘art of dealing with sudden and unexpected events.” (Juneja). It can also be viewed as the “process” of dealing with the sudden and unexpected changes in the culture of an organization (Juneja). Similarly, Holla, and Ristvej, and Titko (204) defined crisis management as a “process” that has been designed to diminish or avert the damages resulting from a crisis.    

2.2.2 GHP model of crisis management

The GHP model of crisis management was advanced by Gonzales-Herrera and Pratt in 1995, and asserts that crises can be managed using four phases. In other words, crisis management progresses through the i) issues management phase, ii) planning and prevention phase, the crisis phase, and finally, iv) the post-crisis phase (Strother 3). The issues management phase involves the scanning of the environment to collect date, identify the trends, and single out issues that could escalate into crises. It also involves the assessment of risks from the stakeholders’ perceptions of the threats to determine the probability or likelihood of the occurrences and the potential ramifications they pose if they escalated to a crisis level. The planning and prevention phase involves the development of proactive response policies to address the potential crises that emerge from the issues management phase. It also involves the identification of an extant problem with the potential of evolving into a full-blown crisis. In the crisis phase, the crisis responses are evaluated, negative publicity preempted, and the messages targeted towards the appropriate audiences. Finally, the post-crisis phase   

2.2.3 Chaos Theory

Speakman and Sharpley (8) present the chaos theory as an explanation for crisis caused by natural events. According to this theory, systems are always on the verge of chaos even though they seem to be stable. In this regards, the stability of systems is often interrupted by unpredictable and inconsequential events, which trigger chaos and thus, precipitate crises. The crisis theory recognizes that systems are characterized by randomness, complexities, unpredictability, and dynamism, which contradicts the Newtonian perspective of the linearity and predictability of the constituent elements of a system (Speakman and Sharpley (4). However, chaos theory suggests that chaotic systems can renew and reorganize themselves despite having periods of abrupt transformation that are marked with chance and irreversibility. Therefore, despite being unpredictable, complex chaotic systems are steady and ordered because they fall back to stability after disruptive interludes. This theory is applicable in crisis management because of the butterfly effect of crisis triggers that are often apparently inconsequential (Speakman and Sharpley 8). Specifically, the butterfly effect is the escalation of trivial issues into crisis levels by initiating a series of unrelated events.     

2.2.4 Butterfly theory of Crisis Management

The butterfly theory of crisis management builds on the GHP model by focusing on the first phase on issues management. According to Strother (4), this theory suggests that the trivial and unlikely issues and events can lead to substantial adverse effects over time, and therefore should be considered during the process of developing risk images. Similarly, Speakman and Sharpley (8) argue that the butterfly theory is based on the chaos theory because the events that appear to be insignificant and unlikely can act as triggers that overturn a system into chaos and crisis before it reorganizes itself back to an equilibrium. It is the recognition of the crisis triggers that make the butterfly theory useful in crisis management.  

2.2.5 Black Swan Theory

The black swan theory is closely related to the butterfly theory because it posits that surprising events can have significant effects and are not often recognized until the crisis they caused is over. The term black swan is based on the historical belief of their nonexistence, meaning that black swan events are not expected to occur. Advanced in 2007 by Nassim Taleb, a renowned Lebanese-American statistician, the theory suggests that some unexpected events (black swans), often considered to be outliers from mathematical analysis, can have huge effects of historical proportions when they occur collectively (Bellomo et al. 3). This theory is relevant in crisis management because it invites attention to the events that seem most unlikely and unpredictable during the risk identification process. In this regard, the focus should not be on predicting the occurrence of such events, but rather on building resilience to withstand their negative effects, thus turning the black swan into a white swan.  

2.2.6 Diffusion of Innovation Theory

The diffusion of innovation theory, which was advanced by Everett Rogers, explains how new ideas and innovations are spread across a community. Innovation is diffused by being initially adopted by a small number of people that are open to new ideas before others are roped in gradually. The theory stipulates that a critical number of about 20% of the population should adopt the new ideas before the remaining people, who make the large majority of the population, follow suite. However, some people will adopt the new ideas at a very slow pace, while others will reject the ideas altogether. The speed of uptake of the new ideas is dependent on i) its advantages, ii) complexities, iii) ease of application, iv) visibility of change through observable effects, and v) conformity to the community or society. This theory is applicable in crisis management because it explains the adoption of new behaviors and practices during a crisis that would lessen its adverse effects. Therefore, the theory helps identify the behaviors and practices that are most amenable to change during crises situations, thus informing the crisis mitigation strategies. In addition, the theory amplifies the role of communication in the transmission of innovations from one individual to others in the community and society.

2.2.7 Structural-functional systems theory

The structural-functional systems theory emphasizes the importance of communication in crisis management. It asserts that information in organizations flows through networks that are patterned. This theory underpins the importance of sharing information in an organization during a crisis. It also addresses the complexities of information networks and the levels of command in organizations that make up their information structures. According to Scott and Lewis (13), this theory is based on the systems theory and is used to explain the importance of interactions between organizations, such as those in the healthcare industry, to improve how they address complex situations. It also provides insights into the narrowing and closing of knowledge and communication gaps in complex medical networks (Scott and Lewis 13). However, information flow within micro and macro-networks is influenced by rules, ideologies, contexts and actors. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of a crisis management strategy is enhanced when correct information flows transparently and unhindered across all the hierarchies of a system, organization or society.

2.2.8 Unequal human capital theory

The unequal human capital theory explains the role of discrimination lawsuits in fomenting crises in organizations. According to Juneja, employees that are disgruntled by discriminatory practices, such as unfair job profiling, unequitable salaries, or categorization in castes spread rumors that damage the reputation of an organization, which in turn, creates a reputational crisis.

2.2.9 Summary of theoretical foundations and their application to the coronavirus pandemic

The definition of crises and risks gravitate around organizations. In turn, crisis management is often viewed from an organizational perspective by addressing corporate management most of the times. In the same vein, crisis management models and theories also focus predominantly on organizations. However, the concepts advanced in these theories are applicable to national, regional, and global crises, like disease pandemics. This is because crises that escalate to levels beyond the organization are also chaotic, unpredictable, and may have far-reaching adverse effects to the wellbeing of huge populations around the world. In the worst cases, disease pandemics present formidable global crises because of their potential to cause fatalities. Therefore, organizational crises have many commonalities with national, regional and global crises. Moreover, organizational crisis can escalate to a national, regional, and global level when they adversely affect an entire industry. For instance, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 is a typical example of an organizational crisis, involving banks in this case, which escalated to global proportions by spreading across the financial sector across the world, ravaging individual, national and global economies. Similarly, disease outbreaks in one country or even region in a country, can reach pandemic levels that can precipitate into public health crises of global proportions. In the contemporary society, infectious diseases still present a significant risk to the lives of people across the world and are able to foment crises like the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.

However, crisis management at the global level differs significantly from that used in the organizational level in its planning, execution, and implementation rather than in its principles. For instance, global crisis call for the attention of governments and international agencies unlike organizational crisis which involve the organizational management only. Therefore, the hugeness of global crisis call for more complex crisis management approaches that bring together different organizations in nations and on the international stage, often being spearheaded by governments, either individually or in collaboration. In many cases, strategies of crisis management that are used at the global level are often formulated in the highly-developed countries who marshal their powerful global position and influence, huge capital muscle, and enormous research and human capabilities. This backdrop helps in the application of the models and theories of crisis management to global crises.      

The four-stage progression of crises management advanced by the GHP model of crisis management is applicable in global crisis, only that the period of the entire management process may be lengthy compared to that at the organizational level. In addition, relatively small unpredictable and inconsequential events occurring in one country escalate to global proportions through the butterfly effect, with many of them being black swans that reveal their true ramifications only after the crises have abated, as explained by the chaos theory, the butterfly theory, and the black swan theory. Similarly, global crisis also require extensive adoption of new ideas and innovations for effective crisis management as explained by the diffusion of innovation theory. However, in the global stage, such adoption is bedeviled by complex factors that differ between countries and can be very slow, thus presenting disjointed and uneven crisis management outcomes, which can be explained using the unequal human capital theory, when used to explain the effect of inequalities across different countries. In the same vein, cohesive and seamless communication is critical when managing global crises as explained by the structural-functional systems theory. International bodies like the world health organization (WHO) in this case, play a critical role in furnishing the world with pertinent, regular, and vital information on managing the coronavirus pandemic at the individual, national, and international levels. Information sharing across the healthcare networks and governments is critical in managing the ongoing pandemic, as recommended by the structural-functional systems theory.

2.3 Historical Background of Pandemics and their Related Crises

National, regional, and global pandemics have been published widely. However, this review focuses on public health crises that have had significant global impacts. In addition, technological developments and international conflicts have created health-related emergencies that have ravaged huge populations with unprecedented disaster levels. 

2.3.1 Black Plague

Schmid el al. (3020) noted that the Black Plague that occurred between 1347 and 1353 is renowned for its decimation of huge populations in Europe and its extended perverseness in the continent for four centuries. The plague pandemic was caused by the spreading of Yersinia pestis, which is a disease causing bacterium, which was propagated by rodent fleas. In this respect, it is considered as a zoonotic disease because it was passed on to humans by animals and insects, in this case, rodents and fleas. The disease, which was also known as Black Death, is thought to have originated in Asia where the disease-carrying fleas infested humans as an alternative host after the decimation of rodents due to dramatic climatic changes. The disease was transported to Europe, where its effects were experienced the most, through the Silk Road and by maritime transportation of flea-infested rats and goods, which explains its concentration in the European seaports (Schmid el al. 3023).  

Byrne (xvii) gives a wider account of plague epidemics in the world noting that the world experienced three plague pandemics before it was finally controlled. Notably, plague, which is caused by the Yersinia pestis bacterium and manifested as septicemic, pneumonic, or bubonic when it attacked the bloodstream, lungs, or the lymphatic system respectively, first appeared in the 6th century in Western Europe and Mediterranean areas. The Black Death is the Second Plague Pandemic and persisted until the 1840s. The third plague pandemic occurred in the 1880 and ravaged China mostly; until it was controlled in the 1970 after the “bacteria-flea-rodent-flea-human” link became clear through scientific advancements (Bryne xviii). Byrne (xix) reveals that Europeans used several interventions, including prayer, remedies, flight, quarantine and isolation, all of which were futile prior to the understanding of the disease mechanism. 

Kasarla (1) revealed that Black Death decimated about 60% of the global population largely because its causative agent and transmission mechanism were unknown until during the third pandemic. Moreover, due to the short-lived protection of vaccines and prevalence of the bacterium is wildlife, the plague persists to date, especially in Africa, Latin American, and Asia. In this regard, over 95% of the current plague cases are from Peru, Madagascar and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with between 1,000 and 5,000 cases and 100-200 deaths being reported to WHO every year in the last two decades (Kasarla 1). In 2019, 3 cases have been reported in china, among Mongolians who ate infested meat (Kasarla 1).

Mark, a philosophy professor, gives a detailed account of the devastating effects of black plague in Europe. He revealed that the plague pandemic had far-reaching positive and negative effects to the European society. On the positive side, black plague demolished the feudal system by raising the socioeconomic status of the serfs following the mass deaths of peasants. In addition, medicine advanced as medical knowledge spread through increased translation and circulation of medical texts and the questioning of traditional treatment approaches, which had proven ineffective in containing the pandemic. Hospitals became treatment centers with higher levels of patient care and cleanliness rather than mere isolations centers for the sick. Moreover, women’s position in society improved and their rights progressed because they were allowed to own and run their husbands’ land and businesses upon the decimation of men (Mark). On the negative side, Mark revealed that agricultural production plummeted due to the reduction of labor while persecution of the marginalized communities, especially Jews, escalated because they were though to transmit the plague. Besides, the authority of the Christian church was challenged due to the ineffectiveness of prayer and fasting is containing the pandemic (Mark).        

2.3.2 The Spanish flu

Radusin (812) informs that Spanish flu of 1918 was a form of influenza that was associated with Spain during the First World War. The association of the pandemic with Spain is attributed to Spanish journalists and media that reported about it widely since the country was not participating in the war. The pandemic caused 50 million fatalities globally (Radusin 812).

Martini et al. (E64) notes that over 1,100 soldiers were hospitalized barely three weeks after the first case of an infected cook in a military camp (Camp Fuston) in Kansas was reported. The pandemic occurred in two waves, with the second wave being more deadly than the first due to the mutated virus. The movement of soldiers during the war and maritime movement were responsible for the spread of the disease from Europe to the United States, Africa and eventually Asia. However, Martini (E65) revealed that it took over a decade to identify and isolate the human influenza virus in 1930s and even then no cure was found while it lasted.

2.3.3 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)

Zumla, Hui, and Perlman (995) revealed that the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) was a disease caused by coronavirus that ravaged the Arabian Gulf countries, Europe, Asia, and the United States in 2014.  It has a high fatality rate of 34.3% having caused 866 fatalities from 2519 cases to date. The United Arab Emirates registered 74 cases and 10 deaths, constitution a 14% fatality rate. Froes (114) notes that the MERS-CoV outbreak started 2012 in Saudi Arabia having originated from bats and using dromedary camels as intermediate hosts. In addition, Gardner (2) noted that MERS-CoV incubates for 2-14 days before its exhibits symptoms, such as shortness of breath, coughs, and fever before escalating to pneumonia and consequently, respiratory failure. Moreover, community transmission of the virus is possible through droplets and direct contact by asymptomatic carriers, which is enhanced during cold and low humidity climatic conditions (Gardner 2).   

2.3.4 Chemical and Biological Warfare

Several publications have documented the use of chemical and biological agents in violent conflicts and war. Thavaselvam and Flora (521) noted that the deliberate use of harmful chemical and biological agents in warfare was challenging because it causes enormous fatalities, and disrupted the economic and social status of populations and countries. In this regard, Haines and Fox (98) revealed that the Assyrians weaponized biological and chemical agents, such as fungi, to contaminate water as far back as 600 BCE while the Greeks used some form of napalm during the Peloponnesian War in 423 BCE. In the same vein, Carus (222) notes that biological and chemical agents were indistinguishable before the development of the germ theory in the 20th century, with many poisons and diseases being attributed to chemicals rather than pathogens.  Kasarla (2) revealed that the plague causing Yersinia pestis bacterium has been used a biological weapon in warfare for centuries with infected corpses being catapulted over city walls during the Black Death pandemic, while aerosolized bacteria and infected feels were dropped from aircrafts during the cold war. However, the First World War ushered the large-scale use of lethal chemicals and biological agents with Germany using chlorine against the allied forces during the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915, and glanders and anthrax to decimate domestic animals in Europe, Argentina, and the United States (Carus 224).

In the Middle East, phosgene and mustard gas were used by Egyptians against Yemen between 1963 and 1967, while Iraq used mustard gas and nerve agents against the Kurds and Iranians during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war (Haines and Fox 101). In this regard, the UAE is a state party to the chemical weapons convention (CWC) and the biological and toxin weapons convention (BTWC), although it is not a member of the Australia Group (AG) (Nuclear Threat Initiative 4). This has helped the country build resilience in combating the use of biological and chemical agents in conflicts by collaborating with international partners.

2.4 Critical Review of Existing Literature

2.4.1 Crisis Management 

Li et al. (601) note that effective communication plays a critical role in crisis management because it is central to effective crisis response. They go on to explain the crisis communication best practices using social media. Specifically, they reveal that the best way to apply social media in crisis communication is to i) integrate social media fully in the decision-making and policy development processes, ii) engage actively in online dialogue, use the affordances provided by social media to deliver credible sources of information, iii) being cautious about the speed of message updates on social media, iv) use and own the hashtag, v) monitor misinformation, and vi) pursue cooperation between public and private organizations. Kim and Liu (69) observes that the 2009 influenza outbreak (H1N1) that started in Mexico, marked the beginning of using social media and other online technologies in addressing global pandemics. They note that the disease outbreak received extensive media coverage and therefore, presented opportunities in the application of social media in crisis response approaches to enhance the engagement and education of the public.        

2.4.1 National and Foreign Policy during Pandemics

Several policy interventions within countries have been used to address pandemics. For instance, Rosner (39) notes that the United States responded to the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic by instituting public health policy guidelines such as maintaining public cleanliness and other sanitary measures like cleaning the physical environment, using the public sewer system for waste removal, enhanced food inspection, and the provision of clean water. Also, limiting public gatherings to reduce interpersonal contact and suspending church meetings and schools became prominent public policy pronouncements of checking the disease spread. In addition, the public health department was elevated by the increasing authority of experts and state governments, allowing it to provide leadership in championing interventions. Consequently, the department experienced much less resistance from individuals, businesses and communities. Moreover, new intervention approaches such as quarantining, whether voluntary of enforced, isolating the infected people from the healthy ones, and enhance population surveillance, gained prominence in understanding and containing the pandemic (Rosner 39). In the same vein, Martini et al. (E65) revealed that local authorities in European countries restricted or closed public spaces such as the churches by limiting services to 5 minutes, limited passengers in public transport, closed theatres, and banned crowding, spiting in public, and burial rituals. In addition, public places were cleaned and disinfected while soap and clean water were provided to poor populations. Moreover, increased surveillance helped identifies infected people, who were subjected to quarantine and isolation to curb the spread of infections (Martini et al. E65). In fact, Martini et al. (E66) argues that the policy interventions such as surveillance, sanitation, isolation and health education that are used today were developed during the Spanish flu pandemic.   

Kamradt-Scott and McInnes (S96) discusses how pandemic influenza has become a security threat due to its pervasive fatalities and widespread disruptions of economic and social wellbeing of large populations. The securitization of pandemic influenza gained prominence in the 1990s, after the nuclear threat receded with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and attention was focused on unconventional security threats (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes S99). However, the framing of the pandemic as a security threat accelerated in the 2000s following the outbreak of H5N1, SARS, and influenza in 1997, 2003, and 2009 respectively. The term, threat, to describe these influenza pandemics became commonplace in medical, political, and military circles, leading the world health organization to describe it as such and invite action from the military.

Nowadays, the World Health Organization (WHO) champions the management of global pandemics by furnishing the world with the status of the diseases and issuing guidelines for containing them. In turn, these guidelines are domesticated as public health policies in different countries.  Mullen notes that the World Health Organization is the central international organization spearheading the global response to the Covid-29 pandemic as a “specialized agency” of the United Nations that brings together member countries under the World Health Assembly. Mullen revealed that the primary mandate of WHO is to i) coordinate emergency responses across the world, ii) monitor health risks, and iii) promote health. In this respect, Mullen observed that WHO, through the International Health Regulations (IHR) was first notified about the disease occurrence in December 31, 2020, when it was informed about the several pneumonia cases in Wuhan, China, which was followed by its news publications about the disease outbreak on January 5, 2020, promising to continue monitoring the situation closely.    

The WHO is instrumental in facilitating countries increase their healthcare capacity to address pandemics. For instance, Mullen notes that WHO facilitates country preparedness by conducting technical training programs in 13 languages about Covid-19. In addition, apart from availing critical equipment and suppliers to 126 countries across the world, WHO established a Pandemic Supply Chain Network by partnering with the World Economic Forum. Further, WHO has partnered with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) and other agencies in the United Nation system to help countries develop and operationalize Strategic preparedness and response plans along with technical expertise (Mullen).  

2.4.2 Coronavirus Pandemic

Singhal (281) gave a detailed account of the coronavirus pandemic, including the nature of the disease-causing virus, its origin, and its global spread. Signhal noted that the pandemic was due to the rapid global spread of a severe acute respiratory syndrome caused by corona virus 2 also known as SARS-CoV-2. Cascella et al. (1) explains that the experts in the international committee on taxonomy of viruses (ICTV) assigned the term SARS-CoV-2 to the virus because it resembled the one that caused the SARS outbreak back in 2002-2003. The virus is new, although it belongs to the coronavirus family (the CoVs), which are single-stranded RNA viruses (+ssRNA) that are often isolated from different animals, hence the name of coronavirus disease of 2019, which has been shortened to Covid-19 (Cascella et al. 1).    

2.4.2.1 Crisis management of the coronavirus pandemic

Sohrabi et al. (71) revealed that the World Health Organization declared Covid-19 a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020. This was a month after the first reports of the disease were reported in December 31, 2020 from Wuhan City in China. However, Mullen noted that prior to this declaration, WHO convened the first IHR Emergency Committee meeting in 22nd and 23rd of January2020 following the spread of the disease outside China. On March 11, 2020, WHO declare Covid-19 a global pandemic following the 13-fold escalation of cases outside china and 3-fold increase in the number of countries recording Covid-19 cases (Cucinotta and Vanelli 157). However, WHO advised that although nations with vulnerable health systems were at a high risk of being overwhelmed by the pandemic, detecting the disease through testing, isolating of infected people, promptly treating those with the disease, and tracing contacts quickly would interrupt the disease spread (Sohrabi et al. 71).

Wiedemeyer noted that the Covid-19 outbreak was presenting an enormous crisis management challenge considering that it was expected to reduce the 2.5% gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate projected at the beginning of 2020 to 0%. This was occasioned by the increasing disruptions and uncertainties in business and economy globally. Notably, businesses would struggle from the spillover effects of the coronavirus pandemic due to financial market uncertainties, supply chain disruptions, delayed and withheld investments, reduced consumer spending, ongoing travel restrictions, and increased restrictions at the workplaces (Weidemeyer). Gates (1677) provided a similar observation by noting that Covid-19 was a serious global threat because of its ability to kill healthy adults with a fatality rate of about 1%, thus making it more severe compare to the typical seasonal influenza, and its efficient transmission between people, whereby an infected person can pass it on to an average or 2-3 other people. Moreover, when compared to SARS, Covid-19 is more deadly because it can be transmitted efficiently by asymptomatic people unlike SARS, which was only passed on by symptomatic people.     

2.4.2.2 Best International Practices

The World Health Organization has furnished several guidelines for the public and governments. For instance, washing hands with soap and running water or an alcohol-based hand rub regularly kills the coronaviruses that are lodged in the hands. Maintaining a minimum of 1 meter from others may prevent someone from contracting the virus from droplets in the breath of infected persons. Moreover, avoiding the touching of eyes, mouth, and nose prevents the transfer of the virus from infected surfaces to the body by hands. For those that are infected already, keeping away from other through self-isolation, and following good respiratory hygiene when coughing and sneezing, prevents the transmission of the virus to those that are not infected. In the same vein, wearing a face mask when out in the public protects individuals from infecting each other.

Governments can also take several measures. For instance, they are advised to separate those that are infected from the healthy population, which can be done by quarantining those that are infected. In addition, those with respiratory difficulties can be assisted using respirators to allow their bodies to fight the infection, since there is no cure yet. However, the responses of some countries are notable for their unique outcomes; with some countries obtaining impressive results while other experience massive devastation. For instance, Remuzzi and Remuzzi (1227) compared the approaches used by in the Hubei region of China and Italy, which have roughly the same populations (50 million and 60 million respectively) and noted that china had more stringent containment measures compared to Italy, thus making china more successful at controlling the spread of the disease compared to Italy.

Heijmans reported that Singapore had succeeded to tame the coronavirus pandemic largely, by enjoying total compliance from the public, using aggressive contact tracing and containment approaches, and having a well-developed healthcare system. He noted that Singapore’s success can be attributed to the swift and immediate restriction of people that had travelled to China and South Korea along with a stringent regime of hospital and home quarantining. The punitive measures for flouting quarantine requirements included fines, prison sentences, and revocation of residency status for foreign individuals (Heijmans). Besides, the country had learned from its experience with SARS by having ready quarantine facilities and a national infectious disease management center with 300 beds. Besides, the government used the unquestioning media to disseminate information, with the prime minister confidently assuring the public of the government’s preparedness to avert panic and anxiety (Heijmans).   

2.4.2.3 Current Challenges

Preventing and containing epidemics and pandemics remains challenging despite advancements in technology and knowledge about infectious diseases. The World Health Organization (25) explained these challenges extensively by noting that firstly, globalization and specifically, dense populations in urban settings, increased international travel, forces migration by conflict-induced mass displacements, and increased contact between people and wild animals had not only increased the speed and reach of infections spreading across the world but also the virulence of pathogens making them adaptable to diverse conditions. Secondly, traditional control measures, such as quarantining and antibiotics were increasingly becoming ineffective as people valued freedom more and developed microbial resistance respectively (World Health Organization 26). Thirdly, the global setting made it difficult to have solidarity and equity in developing cohesive strategies and accessing resources to implement countermeasures because of divergent and complex economic, political, and social factors. For instance, global market forces made it difficult to have fair distribution of resources, with the poor and underdeveloped countries suffering the most from pandemics. Thirdly, the rapid flow of infodemics comprising of factual, false, contradicting, and controversial information especially through the internet and social media, hindered effective control measures. In this regard, risk communication was often ineffective because it lacked credibility, was delayed and infrequent, and full of uncertainties (World Health Organization 26). In the same vein, Duncan argued that human mobility is the biggest challenge of containing disease pandemics. The movement of people has been responsible for moving infectious diseases from one person to the other and from one region to another. This has been demonstrated by previous pandemics as well as with the ongoing covid-19 disease. However, Duncan notes that the movement of people was not restricted during the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, causing about 50 million fatalities, which were a third of the global population at the time. In the same breath, Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (20) noted that countries lacked sufficient local and national leadership because resources were only mobilized when the health crises produced much panic and fear. In addition, poor countries were often unprepared because of the lack of international support, despite the enormous commitments by the wealthy nations. Consequently, over two-thirds of countries across the world has not complied with the international health regulations (IHR) developed in 2005, thus they were unable to deal with large and sudden influxes of patients with highly transmissible diseases. 

2.5 Gaps in Previous Studies

The literature in crisis, risks and crisis management adopt an organizational view predominantly. Specifically, the definitions of concepts, the theories of crisis management, and the application of crisis management strategies that have been published widely focus on individual organizations with few focusing on crisis management strategies at the global level. This may be attributed to the rarity of global crises compared to national crises. In this respect, most literature on global crisis has focused on the economic crises caused by global financial crisis of 2007-2008, yet even then country interventions rather than global strategies in crisis management have featured prominently.

In this respect, one of the glaring gaps revealed by literature is the complexity in addressing crises at the global scale due to challenges in international collaboration. The literature revealed that crisis management interventions on global crises are often disjointed between countries, thus lacking cohesion. Notably, the wealthy and highly industrialized countries dominate the crisis management strategy formulation and come up with interventions that they expect would be adopted by other countries. The shortcoming with this situation is that the intervention measures do not consider the unique circumstances in diverse countries and therefore may be unsuited, especially for the less developed and economically disempowered countries. Moreover, the recommendations provided by international agencies, such as the World Health Organization, were often ignored, or implemented in a manner that yielded suboptimal outcomes due to economic, social, and political factors, along with the strong market forces that favored the wealthy nations and marginalized the poor ones. Therefore, the world was often caught unawares by global pandemics, and therefore were few historical lessons to learn from except those from the black plague pandemic. Therefore, there were gaps in studies dealing with global pandemics because the events were inexistent, and the few that had been studied had not reached the global proportions of Covid-19. More significantly, the United Arab Emirates has not experienced a crisis of covid-19’s magnitude despite having been afflicted by the MARS epidemic in 2014, and therefore, there are not prior studies on handling a crisis of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic’s magnitude.     

Secondly, the literature revealed that despite the established importance of information networks, and the seamless and transparent flow of information during crises, countries still withhold vital knowledge and information about their national strategies as a way of protecting their national interests. In other words, geopolitics often clouds communication and collaboration in global crises, despite the efforts of the United Nations agencies such as WHO in this case. With covid-19, it was necessary to determine whether geopolitics also played a role, considering that this was the first truly global pandemic of the modern times with very different political, social, and economic environments compared to those during the Black Plague. For the United Arab Emirates, the influence of geopolitics during the MERS epidemic was regional. Therefore, there lacks information regarding the global geopolitics have influenced the covid-19 crisis management in the country.

Thirdly, the literature revealed the challenges experienced by international agencies in marshalling global action and collaboration, considering that they do not have the authority to dictate the actions of individual states even in crisis situations. In this regard, the influence of the United Nations and the World Health Organization is being put to test considering that it is the first time they have had to deal with a global crisis of the extent presented by the covid-19 pandemic. In this regard, studies regarding the coronavirus pandemic are few and still being conducted. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates has not had to work with these agencies when their attention was being demanded by all other nations across the world. Therefore, it would be critical to investigate how the country has interacted with these agencies under the ongoing coronavirus crisis.     

3.0 Methodology

This section details the methods that were employed to conduct the study.

3.1 Research Method

This study is conducted using the qualitative research approach because of the in-depth information it provides about a phenomenon. Qualitative research was preferred because it is appropriate for investigating a phenomenon within its natural setting, rather than in experimentally controlled conditions, which obscures some details and manipulates reality.

A review of literature and archived materials is the preferred study approach because it presents extensive information related to pandemics and the covid-19 disease experienced diverse locations across the world and in the United Arab Emirates.

3.2 Study Setting

The United Arab Emirates is the setting of the study. The country is located at the center of China, from where the covid-19 disease originated, and Europe, which was the first epicenter of the pandemic outside China. Moreover, it is a centrally-positioned hub of the aviation industry and therefore experienced much traffic of foreign-based travelers using the country as a stopover in their transnational journeys. Besides, the country has a large population of expatriates from across the world, making it a meeting point of people from several nationalities that travel in and out of the country regularly.  

3.3 Data Collection

Secondary data is obtained from peer-reviewed journal articles, news items from renowned media houses, publications from Emirati and international organizations, government reports, and expert opinions from reliable professional personalities. An internet search was used to access the secondary sources using keywords like global pandemics, coronavirus pandemic, covid-19, crisis management of infectious diseases, and coronavirus management in the United Arab Emirates, which were used in several combinations to yield as many publications as possible. The publications were perused for relevance, source authenticity and reliability, and recentness to choose those to be used in the study. Secondary sources published in the last 10 years were preferred, although those that were older were accepted if they contained important historical information that is pertinent to the study.   

3.4 Data Analysis

The secondary data was subjected to content and thematic analysis to unearth the overarching themes and subthemes of information that would aid in answering the research questions. Care was taken to ensure that the secondary date addressed the objectives of the study by providing a wide variety of relevant information.

4.0 Results

This section describes the findings from the analysis of the secondary sources. The results are categorized under various themes, including the prevalence and severity of the covid-19 pandemic, impact of the pandemic, the government interventions, the challenges experienced, and the lessons learned from other countries by the United Arab Emirates.  

4.1 Prevalence and Severity of the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates recorded 220 fatalities out of the 23,358 positive cases of covid-19 recorded by 17 May 2020. This follows the addition of four more people who passed on and 796 more people who turned out positive for the virus on within 24 hours leading to this day. However, the country had registered 8,512 recoveries, which was 36.44% of all the positive cases by 17th of May. Moreover, the daily cases of new infections had surpassed 750 people and remained as such for the week that commenced on 10 May after surging from a high of 567 on May 4, as illustrated in figure 2. The highest number of the daily new cases recorded in 994 on 22 May.

Figure 2. Daily positive cases of Covid-19 in UAE

Source: Worldometers   

The United Arab Emirates registered the first fatality from the coronavirus pandemic on March 20, when 2 people died. This number remained unchanged for a week before rising exponentially and reaching the 200 mark in May 11 just over 7 weeks later, as demonstrated in figure 3. The country registered its highest daily fatality of 13 people on May 10, before the number fell dramatically to a rate of 2-4 people daily thereafter, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 3. Total deaths from Covid-19 in UAE

Source: Worldometer

Figure 4. Daily fatalities from Covid-19 in UAE

Source: Worldometers

Moreover, the infection rate among the healthcare workers was 4%, which was lower than the 10% global rate.

4.2 Impact of Covid-19 pandemic in UAE

The coronavirus pandemic has had extensive social and economic ramifications on UAE. The cessation of international travel across the world, along with the grounding of Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways, which are the national carriers of the country, have dented the country’s economy.  

4.3 Interventions by the Government of UAE

4.3.1 Government Policies and Agencies

The UAE government responded promptly through its National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority (NCEMA), which coordinated the actions of different government ministries and agencies. Notably, the NCEMA learned from the MERS epidemic in the country and enhanced its preparedness for nationwide pandemics. Therefore, it was activated through a UAE Cabinet resolution to coordinate the activities, especially of the Ministry of Health and Prevention (MoHaP) and Ministry of Interior, as the lead ministries in combating the pandemic. The country also closed its border from international travel, although it started by restricting movement from certain countries, such as Qatar, Thailand and Iran, alongside travel advisories to and from high risk countries, like China, South Sudan, Yemen, Congo, Madagascar and Lebanon. In addition, the country was placed in a night-time curfew, which was extended to a 24-hour curfew in Dubai.  

4.3.2 Movement Control

The government of the United Arab Emirates instituted some immediate interventions to address the entry and spread covid-19 in the country. For instance, the country suspended temporarily the entry of all people, including its citizens for 2 weeks starting March 19, 2020. It also suspended the issuing of visas on arrival at the country’s airports and seaports. This decision affected even those holding exempted passports, until such as time that the countries of departure have established medical clearance processes. Moreover, the country closed its borders on March 26, with its major international carriers, Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways grounding their aircraft and suspending flights.

4.3.3 Testing, quarantine, and isolation

UAE has one of the best testing regimes in the Gulf region along with Saudi Arabia with a testing rate of about 209,797 tests per million people in the population, having surpassed Iceland, which was once leading globally, but now has conducted 173,260 tests per a million of its population (Worldometers). The country had 3 labs that could conduct at last 10,000 tests a day, along with 14 drive-through testing locations. Moreover, the government had mobile laboratory units that conducted door-to-door tests, especially for the elderly people and those with disabilities. While those suspected to have the virus, along with the elderly and vulnerable groups, had tests conducted without charge, other people paid AED for voluntary tests. In the same vein, officials from the Ministry of Interior and the police were using smart helmets that were fitted with thermal cameras, facial recognition sensors, and QR code readers to surveil people and vehicles while maintaining safe distances. In turn, through the mass testing program, the country had managed to test 2,072,493 people by the end of end of 26th May 2020.   

The ministry has also provided guidelines to people entering the UAE. These people were advised to visit the nearest healthcare facility and discuss their conditions and travel history with the doctor, follow the instruction from the doctors, including self-isolation and avoidance of direct contact with other people, and using information from reliable sources only. These instructions were directed towards those exhibiting the symptoms of Covid-19. Moreover, healthcare workers attending to patients and conducting tests have to walk through self-sanitizing booths for disinfection. This has helped protect the country’s frontline healthcare workers from being infected, considering that their work increases their vulnerability and exposure to covid-19, which is not prevented effectively, can endanger other patients and community members. Altogether, the country undertook aggressive testing of the public, placing it as one of the country’s with the highest testing rate per capital in the world. Similarly, it instituted strict quarantine interventions, with individual building being cordoned off when any of its residents tested positive for coronavirus. In addition, the government locked down locations that have a large number of migrant workers in addition to decongesting these workers using empty buildings.  

4.3.4 Sanitation

The government of the United Arab Emirates, through its Ministry of Health and Prevention, had adopted the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO) to stem the spreading of Covid-19. These included i) washing hands with water and soap or sanitizing them using an alcohol-based hand rub, ii) maintaining a physical distance of at least a meter away from people exhibiting coughs or sneezes, iii) covering of the nose and mouth when causing or sneezing using a bent elbow or disposable tissue, and iv) avoiding toughing the mouth, nose and eyes. In addition, the government had added other precautions that were sensitive of the country’s culture, such as desisting from shaking hands or nose-to-nose greetings, along with kissing and hugging others, avoiding contact with live or dead animals and consuming large amounts of fluids while taking sufficient rest as well. Moreover, the UAE government has a National Disinfection Program in which streets, public transport and public facilities are cleaned and fumigated at night. During the process, all public movement and transport are restricted while metro services and public transport are suspended. This ensures that all surfaces that are likely to be touched by the public are free from coronaviruses, considering that they have been found to persist on certain surfaces for extended periods, thus raising the risk of infection long after the infected person has left a location.

4.3.5 Communication

Besides, the government has established communication channels to address coronavirus related issues, concerns, and emergencies. The communications are approved by NCEMA before they are disbursed by the Ministry of Health and Prevention, the Federal authorities, and local health authorities. Moreover, the government has a Communications Office, which is under the General Secretariat of the Cabinet. Each body wishing to relay information to the public has to nominate an official spokesperson to be approved by NCEMA. Besides, communications are made using diverse media, including visual, audio, and print, along with websites, digital, and social media. For instance, the Istijaba call center, which was launched in November 24, 2019 by the Department of Health in Abu Dhabi, is dedicated to facilitating communication with the Department of Health (DoH), thus operating as the Medical Operations Command Center. Emergency requests are directed to healthcare facilities through a toll free number through Istijaba. Likewise, Dubai Health Authority (DHA) had launched the “doctor for every citizen” service in December 17, 2019, which was a telemedicine service that was available as a mobile app from App Store and Google Play Store. Moreover, the Ministry of Health and Prevention and the Dubai Health Authority (DHA) have also availed toll free numbers to facilitate communication between the public and the healthcare providers. In the same vein, the country, through the Ministry of Health and Prevention and the Departments of Health in the different emirates had websites dedicated to the disease, which furnished vital Covid-19 information to the public. For instance, the ministry’s website has a dedicated awareness center webpage dedicated to the disease, which was available in English and Arabic in addition to a voice facility that enabled one to listen to the contents. Also, the website has links to additional print and visual materials that address diverse covid-19 issues. The DHA website provides information in three languages; Arabic, English and Urdu.

However, the government is discouraging the disbursement of fake and misleading information by requiring that the official entities get approval from NCEMA before commenting about or replying to information related to the coronavirus pandemic. Consequently, those who publish, republish and transmit misleading and false information related to the pandemic are fined AED 20,000.

Several positive sentiments about the efficiency of the UAE’s government in its timely response to covid-19 dominate the local media. For instance, the Government was credited for establishing a National Disinfestation Programme, implementing remote working and distance learning, installing thermal scanner systems in all its seaports and airports, expanding its health insurance coverage, stockpiling food and medical suppliers, constituting highly-qualified medical teams and activating the early warning system in the country. Moreover, the country is applauded for accommodating and attending to 400 students from the GCC countries at the International Humanitarian City after evacuating them from China. In addition, the UAE government has extended humanitarian assistance to Iran, which has been ravaged enormously by the pandemic by regional and global standards.

4.3.5 Law Enforcement

The government has instituted steep fines for violation of regulations. Specifically, a fine of AED 50,000 applied for violation of quarantine regulations, mandatory hospitalization, and retesting requirement. Similarly, noncompliance with the closure instructions of public places such as schools, parks, mall, markets, shopping centers, sports clubs, gyms, and cinemas attracted an AED 50,000 fine for the establishment and AED 500 for clients. Moreover, organizers and participants of gatherings are fined AED 10,000 and AED 5,000 respectively. Notably, refusal to take a test cost the violator AED 5,000, while visiting a healthcare facility unnecessarily attracted an AED 1,000 fine.

5.0 Discussion

This section discusses the findings in relation to the successes and challenges experienced by the government while combating Covid-19. Moreover, the lessons that the country can learn from other countries and the implications of the crisis in crisis management in the country are discussed

5.1 Challenges in the United Arab Emirates Interventions

The UAE government is being challenged by the high number of new daily cases, despite the measures it has put in place. The government’s response towards the pandemic has been swift as it instituted several restrictions for public places and the conduct of its citizens. However, despite the restrictions of movement across the country’s borders, the disease continues to spread in the country, which indicates the establishment of community transmission. This may be attributed to the graduated measures taken by the government. Notably, although international travelers were required to self-quarantine upon arrival into the country during the early days of the pandemic, some international travel, particularly for diplomat passport holders was allowed. In addition, rather than imposing a total lockdown across the country, movement was still allowed in much of the country. Notably, the nighttime curfew only applied for the days the public places were being sanitized, while only Dubai was placed under a 24-hour curfew. Therefore, community transmission is ongoing because of the continued intermingling of the people.

The other challenge was the high number of expatriates who were overrepresented in the covid-19 cases. The exponential increase on the number of infections was being attributed to the congestion in the residences of migrant workers, with the UAE government giving them suboptimal attention compared to that provided to the Emiratis. This exposes UAE to the longstanding problem of deprived working and living conditions among migrant workers, which has always drawn the attention of human rights and workers’ rights lobbyists across the world. However, this challenge was prevalent across several gulf nations with major ongoing construction projects and large populations of migrant workers, such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (Chulov).

5.2 Lessons UAE can learn from Other Countries

The United Arab Emirates can learn from several countries that have succeeded in combating the spread of the coronavirus, with a view of adopting the positive measures. In turn, the country can also learn from countries that have blundered and failed dramatically in combating the spread of the pandemic, which can help it avoid similar actions or inactions in its intervention approaches. Several lessons about the actions that countries have undertaken to achieve positive outcomes are highlighted.  

Firstly, UAE should have locked down the country immediately the pandemic was announced by the WHO to deter movement, which would have prevented the ongoing community transmission. China succeeded in controlling the spread of covid-19 by locking down Wuhan completely, considering that it was the source of the disease. Similarly, New Zealand implemented one of the strictest lockdowns across the world. Unlike China, New Zealand’s lockdown was countrywide. Notably, New Zealand succeeded to almost eliminate the virus in the country by implementing the lockdown measures early, when the country had only 100 positive cases and no fatalities yet (Gunia). Moreover, the New Zealanders were cooperative with the strict measure imposed by their prime minister, Jacinda Ardern. Lockdowns facilitate targeted testing of the inhabitants and the implementation of necessary interventions, such as quarantining and isolation, to slow the spread of the pandemic.

Secondly, South Korea provides a valuable lesson in aggressive and immediate contract tracing of people that have come into contact with those found to be positive is pertinent in stemming the spread of the pandemic. This should be accompanied with intense tensing of the masses to identify those that are infected and isolating them promptly from the society before they infect many others. Indeed, South Korea experienced one of the fastest infection spreads in the world when a single individual infected scores of worshippers at the Shincheonji Church, in turn infecting huge numbers of the people in Daegu. However, the South Korean authorities responded by demanding for the entire list of the church’s membership, who were then tested promptly. Those found to be positive for covid-19 were either hospitalized or isolated in separate units that had been created across the country. This strategy helped the country contain the pandemic within a month, despite being very close to china, which was the source of the disease. In effect, the country succeeded in lowering the new daily infections from 800 to less than 100 within the first two week of the interventions (Thompson).  

Secondly, the use of technologically-assisted surveillance has helped keep track of quarantined individuals, with countries like China, South Korea, Singapore, and Israel leading the onslaught.  For instance, China installed CCTV cameras at the doors of apartments of residents under self-quarantine and forces others to wear wristbands that signaled the authorities when one left quarantine, through a smartphone application. China even used drones to remind people to wear face masks and used digital barcodes installed in mobile applications to indicate the health status of individuals and therefore grant them access to various public places (Kharpal). These barcodes are scanned at the entrance of building and facilities around the country to allow and lock out people based in their disease status. Similarly, Singapore uses a mobile application that contexts cellphones using Bluetooth to identify individuals that have been close to those that have been infected and the people that the potential disease carriers have contacted. South Korea created a map of people that had been near an individual with the coronavirus using a combination of CCTV videos, smartphone location, credit card transactions, and conversations with the public. In the same vein, Israel was using a cell-phone bases system the security agency had developed for counterterrorism interventions to track the movement of those infected and enforce their quarantine. This system contains location data of the Israelis cellphones that had been developed by Shin Bet (Kharpal). However, electronic surveillances have raised concerns of individual and personal information privacy, particularly in countries where these rights are defended fiercely.    

Thirdly, the compulsory wearing of face masks by all people, especially when they are out in the public has been enforced successfully in more than 50 countries across the world (Al Jaseera News). However, some countries implemented this requirement early in the pandemic, which helped them control the spread of the disease. Notable counties that implemented compulsory wearing of face masks in March of 2020 include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Venezuela, and Vietnam. In this regard, the UAE government can learn the importance of imposing face mask requirements early in a respiratory disease outbreak. Facial mask not only protects the wearer from being infected by others, but also protects others, considering that transmission can occur though asymptomatic carriers of the coronavirus. Countries like Germany, South Korea, and China have managed to keep the spread of the coronavirus infection under control, which is attributed significantly to the extensive use of face masks. China particularly recommended the use of disposable face masks by health people to prevent infections. However, this measure remains controversial in many nations, with the WHO not giving any stringent guidelines on the use of face masks by the public, making it mandatory for health workers only. In this regard, the WHO observes that face masks may only be beneficial when worn by infected people because they would prevent passing on the infection to others. In addition, the WHO does not recommend the use of face masks by healthy people, which has led to the controversies surrounding the public use of face masks.  

Fourthly, collaboration between nations has been useful in addressing the spread of the disease globally. Notably, the WHO and the United Nations (UN) are international agencies that bring together several nations to address global issues, like the covid-19 pandemic in this case. For instance, WHO has offered standard guidelines on prevention and control interventions, while the UN has mobilized global resources to help the disadvantaged countries with underdeveloped economies build their preparation and prevention capacities. In the same vein, the World Bank is supporting several low-income and middle-income countries combat the pandemic through financial support, capacity building, rehabilitation of primary care facilities, and accessing medical supplies (The World Bank). Similarly, the European Union (EU) is one of the best examples of regional cooperation in fighting the pandemic. Notably, the EU has organized joint purchasing of essential equipment, such as respiratory ventilators, face masks, and testing kits. Similarly, the EU has facilitated the repatriation of more than 1800 individual from outside the union member countries. In addition, the EU has availed funds for procurement. In addition, EU countries have been helping each other in various aspects to help the Union fight the pandemic. For instance, the Czech Republic has donated personal protective gear to Spain and Italy. Similarly, Luxembourg has taken in patients from neighboring France that need intensive care. Meanwhile, Germany has supplied Italy with medical equipment to help it address its overrun health system, while France has donated face masks to Italy as well (European Parliament). This assistance has been directed mainly to Italy and France, which have been ravaged severely by the pandemic compared to the other members of the EU.  

 Fifthly, coherence and consistency across the national crisis management approaches are critical for success in addressing nationwide crises. Countries that have powerful regional administrations like China and Germany have managed to come up with a coherent and consistent strategy to address the pandemic in their countries, despite having powerful and almost autonomous authorities in the different regions. The United Arab Emirates comprises of seven emirates, yet each emirate appears to be championing is own intervention approach. In this respect, the UAE government should learn from Germany and China, and thus coordinate its interventions across the different emirates to enhance their cohesiveness and effectiveness. Currently, the Abu Dhabi Health Authority (ADHA) is spearheading the interventions in Abu Dhabi, which the Dubai Health Authority (DHA) is championing the interventions in Dubai, although they operate under the Ministry of Health and Prevention and are directed by NCEMA.  

Contrastingly, the United Arab Emirates can also learn from countries that have undertaken wrongful actions that have prevented the effective control of the pandemic. For instance, the leadership in some countries downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic, by diverting attention, confusing the public, or creating a false sense of security. Notably, the Italian prime minister and the American president created a false sense of security and confused the public by claiming that the high number of positive cases was due to aggressive testing and that they pandemic would end soon as it was similar to the seasonal influenza. Likewise, the Spanish prime minister is criticized for having not implemented a nationwide lockdown early enough even after witnessing Italy become ravaged by covid-19 and locking down its citizens. Equally, the American president has been criticized for delaying to take action for six weeks even after being informed of the threat early enough, while appearing to focus more on his reelection campaigns instead. Similarly, the United Kingdom’s prime minister took the pandemic seriously after being diagnosed with the disease, having squandered opportunities for early intervention from the early information he possessed hack in January. The Brazilian president, like the British prime minister before he was diagnosed with covid-19, resisted social distancing measures, thus suggesting that the disease would not be transmitted so easily and discouraging the citizens from changing their lives because of the pandemic. In all these cases, national leaders made poor judgment calls even after being advised to the contrary by their scientists and health professionals, to the detriment of their citizens.  

5.3 Lessons that UAE can Teach Other Countries

Despite its challenges, UAE has several lessons for countries that are struggling with the pandemic. For instance, the first lesson is on having a crisis management center that is active, ready and well-funded to enhance the emergency readiness of the country. In this case, the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority played a critical role in coordinating the interventions of the different governmental agencies and executing the directives of the UAE government and the decisions of the cabinet. Such an agency enhances the emergency preparedness and resilience of a country. To this end, the agency has published a comprehensive guide for all anticipated emergencies that can befall the country (National Emergency Crisis and Disasters Management Authority 43). The guide is particularly directed to regular citizens and residents of UAE and is presented in simple and clear language. 

The second lesson is the deterrence of noncompliance with government directives using heavy and extensive fines rather than jail terms. The heavy financial burden can modify behavior of people, especially during times of economic difficulty and looming recession. Thirdly, using controlled communication and authorized messages through multiple channels, helps disburse the right information to the citizenry. In UAE, all information is channeled through NCEMA while misinformation was heavily punished through heavy fines.

The third lesson is that rivals needed to collaborate in times when the world was threatened by a global pandemic. In this case, the UAE and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have established network to secure food supplies in the region, which was proposed by Qatar, a rival of the UAE. Moreover, UAE was in the forefront in helping other countries with aid and medical suppliers, especially when the United States refused to do so. In this case, UAE along with other GCC nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, shipped medical supplies to china in February when the pandemic was unfolding and aided Iran, which was ravaged early and hard by covid-19, even while the United States continued with its sanctions and trade restrictions to these countries. This is an important lesson to powerful and wealthy countries that have decided to look inwards and ignore the ravages of the pandemic to vulnerable countries across the world. Moreover, this correspond with the views of Rossi and Kabbani, who argued that that small countries can play a critical role in helping the world during crises, even when the traditional superpowers withhold their assistance.  

The fourth lesson is related to securing food safety in the country, considering that the UAE imports significant amounts of food (80 %) to supplement its local production. In this respect, the government of the United Arab Emirates, in collaboration with The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development, had embarked on securing the region by keeping the supply chains open and facilitating logistical operations (Jaffery par. 8; Webster par. 27). The country has also stocked up a years-worth of essential food supplies comprising rice and wheat (Webster).

In addition, the early investment in food production, which was undertaken after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was paying dividend in ensuring that the United Arab Emirates has not experienced any food shortages during the pandemic. Notably, the country had increased its food resilience by increasing the cultivation of climate-resilient crops. In addition, the government had formulated the National Food Security Strategy in 2018, to enhance local food production and advance towards food sufficiency (Jaffery par. 15). Consequently, the country had used innovative technology, such as hydroponics, to facilitate urban and vertical farming to expand its fruit and vegetable production.  

5.4 Implications of the Coronavirus Pandemic in Crisis Management in the UAE

The civid-19 pandemic has highlighted and emphasized the need for international cooperation, early warning systems, comprehensive emergency response plans to enhance emergency preparedness. The interchange with China in which UAE helped China with medical supplies and China returned the favor when both countries were ravaged by the coronavirus pandemic at different times is a demonstration of the importance of collaboration in addressing global crises. In this regard, UAE is likely to keep its options open in the geopolitical environment to ensure that it maintains relations with countries that exhibit reciprocal behavior even then they are rivals. Moreover, this gesture is likely to endear the country to other regional and international members by positioning the country as a dependable ally. This is particularly critical when the country pursues international collaboration in future, when the country may need to expand its emergency preparedness by seeking assistance from more experienced countries in the Middle East region and around the world.  

The coronavirus pandemic has captured the government’s attention, thus focusing the country’s leadership towards controlling the disease while ignoring other peace processes and conflicts in the region. Indeed, the pandemic has highlighted the importance of national leadership in leading focused interventions, championing good practices, and building the confidence and hope of the citizens when faced with life-threatening emergencies. Indeed, the pandemic has demonstrated the pertinence of taking prompt, decisive, and organized steps when addressing national crises to prevent panic and enhance adherence to regulations and guidelines. Similarly, the importance of early preparedness by using intelligence proactively has emerged as a vital component of crisis management, considering that it facilitates the government to take precautionary measures without placing a heavy financial burden on the country’s economy. Notably, taking measures in the middle of a global crisis, such as covid-19 can expose a country to market forces that manifest as severed supply chains, increased prices, global shortages, and poor coordination due to panic. In this respect, the building of a new medical facility by the UAE government even before covid-19 was declared a global pandemic and emergency is testimony that early preparedness through correct and proactive interpretation of intelligence is critical in global crisis management (Duncan).

However, this situation is problematic because pandemics and national security are closely linked. In this respect, the United Arab Emirates is likely to view pandemics and national security threats, especially when infections are brought into the country from foreign lands. Notably, the adverse effects of the pandemic on the economy of the country and its neighbors set the stage for conflict and rebellion, which can destabilize the country. Therefore, the crisis management strategies formulated by the country must have a significant element of foreign policy that pursues peace and stability in countries in the gulf region. This means that crisis management of global emergencies requires global responses. This is particularly challenging to countries like the United Arab Emirates that are surrounded with hostile neighbors. Often, questions about authoritarian governments and their tendencies to isolate themselves from the international community present challenges in international collaboration and interventions. In this respect, the United Arab Emirates must become a skillful negotiator in the complex global geopolitical landscape in which suspicion, mistrust, and national interests are rife.

6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter reviews and summarizes the study by indicating the extent to which the study questions were answered, aims and objective were achieved, the key findings and their limitations, the usefulness of the study, and the recommendations to the United Arab Emirates and future work.

6.1 Conclusions

The study set out to assess the response of the United Arab Emirates towards the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. More precisely, the study sought to answer two questions. The first one is “What has the United Arab Emirates done to address the coronavirus pandemic?” while the second one is “How effective has been the interventions by the United Arab Emirates in controlling the coronavirus pandemic?” A qualitative study using secondary data was conducted with the relevant information being obtained from government publications, ministerial press releases, newspaper articles, organizational publications, and peer-reviewed articles.

The study revealed that the United Arab Emirates government had taken the coronavirus pandemic seriously and taken early and varied measure to combat its effects and reduce its vagaries to the citizens and the country’s economies. More significantly, the United Arab Emirates had largely combated the fatalities from covid-19, thus keeping them lower than those of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the number of new daily infections in UAE was less than that in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, which indicated that the control of the spread of the virus was more effective in the country compared to the other countries in the region. In fact, it appears as though the country had passed its peak and was on a downward trend much earlier that its neighbors. This success is attributed to aggressive mass testing, which was among the highest in the world, prompt interventions at the beginning of the pandemic, coordinated official communication, and restrictive penalties for contravening regulations and declarations from the government and its agencies. The country had tested over 2 million people at the rate of over 200,000 per million people. In addition, country-wide fumigation exercise and night curfews were imposed to sterilize public places and restrict nigh movement. Similarly, schools and market were closed, with the period being extended as the pandemic continued. Besides, flights in and out of the country were stopped, except those carrying repatriated people and cargo. Therefore, despite the country reporting its first case at the end of January 2020, the Emiratis remained free from infection for over a month as most cases were among immigrants and tourists. In addition, the government has had implemented policies to make the country food secure presently and in future. Specifically, food reserves have been increased, supply chains were kept open, and production had been enhanced using modern technologies. For these reasons, food supplies and stocks were not affected, despite the panic buying by residents.

However, the country was yet to flatten its infection curve, which was still on the rise, with over 700 new cases daily. The rapidly increasing community infections were largely attributed to the migrant workers who worked and lived in congested conditions. Moreover, despite the country reporting its first case at the end of January 2020, at a time when the WHO declared the outbreak a public health emergency, the government took over a month to implement any significant interventions. Rather than isolate the country from the rest of the world, the country chose to help those who were stranded, including citizens from other nations, by offering medical attention in the country. Moreover, the country did not have a strict face mask policy, implemented restrictions in two-week intervals, and let ministries and other authorities provide guidelines addressing the various sectors in the country. This delayed, staggered and hesitant approach may have contributed to the rising infections across the country.

The study revealed that the United Arab Emirates leveraged its advanced information and communication technology infrastructure to reduce economic disruptions by facilitating people to work remotely from home. In the same vein, while schools and colleges were closed for the remaining academic year, their lessons were continuing online. Besides, employers were given guidelines needed to keep their workplaces open and operational, with special attention being given to remote working. Contrastingly, the study also revealed that the United Arab Emirates had a systemic weakness that hindered the expected effectiveness of the intervention measures. In this regard, while the United Arab Emirates has displayed regional collaboration by partnering with its neighbors to secure the regional food supply chains and help other countries that had been ravaged by the disease across the world, particularly those that were not getting any assistance from the traditionally wealthy nations of the west, it has experiences some challenges with internal collaboration. For instance, the different emirates in the country implemented their own policies, with most of the government policies being directed towards Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Increased collaborative initiatives among the different emirates and between countries neighboring the UAE through initiatives like joint planning, information and technology sharing, and capacity building, is critical in securing the country against future threats of a similar kind and any other that are related. Therefore, by adopting good practices, such as, maintaining social distance among its migrant workers, keeping up with regular testing to identify those who should be isolated from society, and imposing stricter movement controls, would help slow the spread of covid-19. 

6.2 Recommendations

Although the United Arab Emirates has largely succeeded in controlling the spread of covid-19 compared to many other countries across the world, its effectiveness would yield better outcomes if the challenges it experiences are addressed. Therefore, it is recommended that:

  1. United Arab Emirates’ government should enhance its local collaboration among the seven emirates to implement interventions cohesively. This requires that the entire country implements interventions that are applicable across the country and not left to individual emirates or cities to decide on what is best. In the current situation, most interventions in UAE focused on Dubai and Abu Dhabi, an indication that each emirate may be working independently and fragmenting interventions. The United States is an example of the consequences of fragmented interventions between states in the same country, with states like New York pleading for resources while others had excessive supplies. To implement this recommendation, the mandate of the National Emergency Crisis and Disasters Management Authority (NCEMA) should be expanded from planning and oversight of disaster preparedness to actual implementation and coordination of the interventions. As the lead state institution, NCEMA is better positioned to manage national crises and implement countrywide intervention in future compared to Dubai and Abu Dhabi authorities working separately, as is the case currently.
    1. In relation to the first recommendation, the United Arab Emirates should create an infectious disease agency akin to the centers for disease and prevention (CDC) to address and coordinate all activities relation to public health threats presented by infectious diseases and other chemical and biological agents that threaten the health of people. This agency should be well funded to undertake continuous surveillance of dangerous pathogens and agents in society, and develop best practices that should be implemented across the country in cases of disease outbreaks and chemical and biological attacks. Currently, disease outbreaks are handled by the Communicable Disease Department under the Ministry of Health and Protection. Similarly, chemical and biological threats are handled by the military mainly. In this respect, the CDC-like particularly critical considering that the country has had previous epidemics, like MERS, that have threated the Emirati population, and is surrounded by hostile nations, such as Israel, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, which have a history of using chemical and biological agents in violent conflicts. Therefore, the agency would take a wholesome approach to these threats and enhance the country’s emergency preparedness. The Ministry of Health and Protection should be the state institution charged with setting up the CDC-like agency because it would deal with health-related hazards predominantly.
    1. The country should work closely with its neighbors and international organizations to secure peace in the region, and therefore lower the risk of pandemics that could degenerate into security threats in the country and region. This collaboration should include information sharing, technology sharing, development of joint strategies, and assisting neighbors with low preparation and intervention capacities. The gulf region has high incidences of political tensions and terrorist attacks, which threaten the security of the nations in the region, including that of the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, suspicions and mistrust levels are high in the Middle East, which makes collaboration between the member states a complex, challenging, and controversial undertaking. However, the Middle East nations are already using artificial intelligence technologies and other modern technologies to combat the spread of the pandemic, albeit of different kinds and in different levels (Graham). Unfortunately, these interventions remain fragmented and uncoordinated between the nations, which could lead to different and unequal outcomes. Therefore, it is recommended that the UAE government takes a leadership role in the region of facilitating the resilience-building, capacity building, public awareness, and technology adoption across the region through collaborative efforts. However, this would require the diffusion of political tensions between nations and building of trust, which focusing on the critical issues, whose solutions are mutually beneficial to the member countries in the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Corporation is the lead state agency that should spearhead regional and international collaboration in future.
    1. The country should work more closely with the World Health Organization, and especially provide it with funding replenish the gap left by the withdrawal of the United States. United Arab Emirates is a wealthy country that can contribute significant capital to the WHO to help it plug any financial shortfalls it may experience in case the united states follows through with its threat of withdrawing from the WHO and stops funding it. The World Health Organization plays a critical role in guiding the world in health related matters and the United Arab Emirates has been a beneficiary of these initiatives. The ministry of finance is the state agency that should spearhead this initiative by budgeting for WHO allocations from the country’s financial kitty.
    1. The government should adopt the good practices from other countries, such as early warning signs and prompt response, lockdowns of entire cities and locations, aggressive mass testing and isolation, and wearing of face masks while in public, to stem the ongoing community infections and prevent the spreading of future pandemics in the country. Already, the UAE government has published best practices that guide responses towards emergencies, including those presented by the threats of terrorism, disease outbreaks, and chemical and biological warfare. However, the guide that was published in 2014 by the National Emergency Crisis and Disasters Management Agency (NCEMA) is in urgent need of updating to bring it to par with the new and emerging realities. The good practices can be operationalized by ensuring that every emirate is well-versed through aggressive, creative, regular, and continuous public awareness campaigns. In this respect, NCEMA remains the state agency that should address crisis management in the United Arab Emirates. Its role in ensuring the country’s preparedness to disasters is significant and requires continuous assessment of the risks and hazards that UAE is exposed to, while ensuring that the prevention and mitigation measures are frequently updated with the most recent good practices.
    1. The government should reconfigure the living conditions of the migrant workers in the country to support the good practices that it recommends. Migrant workers are a critical segment of the emirate population whose role is critical to the development of the country, yet they live and work in suboptimal conditions. Providing them with sufficient personal protection equipment, such as face masks, adequate sanitary facilities, like sanitizers and hand-washing opportunities, and increased access to healthcare, would help reduce their vulnerability to infectious disease pandemics. The Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Services should be the lead government agency charges with improving the living and working conditions for emigrant workers, especially those that are lowly paid.
    1. It is recommended that UAE expands in national food reserves beyond staple cereals to increase food resilience. While expanded food production will advance the country’s journey towards food sufficiency, stocking up of a wide variety of dried foods with enhance its crisis management capabilities. In this respect, the country should stock other dry foods such as powdered milk, dried meats and fish, and dried vegetables and fruits. Building of drying facilities can enable the drying of foods on short notice following a national emergency. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries would be the lead state institution to build the food-drying capability and capacity in the country.

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