Islam and Politics – Is Tunisia’s Ennahdha Still an Islamist Movement?

Posted: January 4th, 2023

Islam and Politics – Is Tunisia’s Ennahdha Still an Islamist Movement?

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Islam and Politics – Is Tunisia’s Ennahdha Still an Islamist Movement?

Introduction

The link between politics and religion is one of the significant issues in post-revolutionary Tunisia. In its present modernization process, religion as well as religious players has held a political importance that the country has not experienced in its recent history. Ennahdha, Tunisia’s oldest Islamic group remains the most important actor in the country’s political landscape. For instance, in 2014, Ennahdha played a critical role in the drafting of the country’s constitution. It also played significant government roles, such as becoming a critical coalition partner. Its collaborations with the country’s conservative and secular actors have influenced the association between politics and religion in significant ways. Due to its multi-prolonged style to its mandate as a prominent and appropriate political actor, it has experienced various ideological as well as organizational changes. Ennahdha has changed from being an Islamic movement to Islamic democracy since it has stopped its religious activities and focused on politics.

An Overview of Islamists and Party Politics

Islamist movements are groups that pursue to be active in cultural, social, as well as political avenues by referencing Islamic doctrines and reinterpreting it for the current environment. This means that such movements seek to lure the state via political action, with the goal of creating a society that is virtuous, as well as going past the political environment into cultural and social activism (Lynch, 2012). Most research on Islamist political behavior is often influenced by the specific limitations enforced by the authoritarian systems within which Islamist movements normally operate in. Since the Eighties, Islamic movements have been actively involved in politics (Lynch, 2012). However, they have remained careful regarding participation in circumscribed political process. Such movements felt that, if winning the elections was impossible, the benefits of politics were few (Lynch, 2012). Consequently, cultural as well as social outreach provided more positive repertoires of dispute. This elaborates why, in a semi-authoritarian system where elections may be conducted but are unfair, Islamic movements remain cautious in politics (Roy, 2012). They believe that, in such contexts, it is hard to win the elections, and they focus on social activism. Consequently, such movements limit their ambitions in politics to shun repression, as was the case in Egypt prior to 2011 and Morocco in 2002 (Roy, 2012). Islamic movements have done little to be active political actors.

However, in semi-authoritarian systems, although Islamic groups face repression, often they receive better treatment than other opposition parties. The explanation for this phenomenon is their expression that they believe to be “authentic” Islamic identity, the status of good governance, focus on people’s social welfare, as well as diverse organizational structures that can enhance mass mobilizations (Netterstrøm, 2015). However, in a system of change away from an authoritarian context, Islamists are mostly entangled in the eventualities of party competition as well as the changing loyalties of the voters. Experiences of secular parties during transitions may be insightful in elaborating the problems that may face an Islamic movement when it shifts to a pluralist political competition (Netterstrøm, 2015). For instance, there is significant substantiation that political parties that emerge winners in inaugural elections in countries that are experiencing political change seldom win a second consecutive term (Netterstrøm, 2015). Therefore, Islamic movements are also likely to flop, just like other parties, to meet the high expectations common in a new political discourse or fail to reach their campaign promises.  

Similarly, the view that Islamic movements have a political advantage is overrated. Extensive research on the performance of such movements, across various nations, reveals that they tend to win fewer positions in elections (McCarthy, 2015).There is a clear pattern that shows that Islamic parties tend to perform well during breakthrough elections, providing significant competition after prolonged repression. This can be proved through instances in Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, Algeria, and Jordan (McCarthy, 2015). In instances where elections are routine, Islamists tend to get reduced votes with time. Angelo Panebianco’s theoretical framework may help explain this phenomenon. While studying group dynamics in European political groups, he noted that antagonistic parties possess an “electorate of belonging,” which is a loyalty reservoir and a group of activists composed of not only professionals motivated by material or status-associated incentives, but also “believers” seeking identity (McCarthy, 2015).With time, a party can change its goals, but it cannot easily change them while retaining the believers.       

Ennahdha’s Origins and Different Currents Before 2011

Ennahdha’s resolution to shift from religion and specialize in politics was the outcome of internal dialogues regarding the link between religion and politics that have influenced it since the Seventies. The unfriendly political context in which the movement began also fuelled the gradual change (Louden, 2015). Under oppressive and authoritarian governments in Tunisia, the party mostly gave priority to its survival and dreaded division by choosing between politics and religion. After 2011’s revolution; however, the group became a lawful political actor as well as contributed in government with distrustful secular patterns, and this accelerated the need to deal with the issue (Louden, 2015).  

The group, that would later be called Ennahdha, first appeared among the conservative groups of the population in the Sixties, in response to suspicions of Westernization in Tunisia after its independence (Louden, 2015). The country obtained its independence in 1956, and immediately its president started a rigorous process of modernization, which involved getting away with all religious entities. The process sought not only the seizure of resources used to fund mosques, charities, as well as Quran schools; but also change of the religious syllabus of Al-Zaytouna Mosque, the leading Islamic as well as educational establishment in the country (Louden, 2015). Polygamy was abolished and a personal status code that enhanced the rights of women was implemented in by a presidential declaration.

Consequently, in the Sixties, a movement of young men, with the intention of securing Tunisia’s Islamic identity, formed the Islamic Group. The Group supported the practice and teaching of a pure type of Islam (Marks, 2015). It started an aggressive process of strengthening Islam by preaching in various mosques across Tunisia and indicating the significance of piety, morality, as well as righteousness. The Group also was against the country process of modernization. It also resisted the country’s conventional religious leaders because they belived that they were influenced by the country’s regime (Marks, 2015). Originally working unnoticeably, it later linked with a partner who helped them infiltrate the ruling party’s Islamic arm: the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD). This was critical since PSD focused on the ensuring that Tunisia is an Islamic society. They obtained this objective by supporting young Islamic preachers (Marks, 2015). This increased the rate at which the religion spread in the country.  

In the Sixties and Seventies, Islamic Group continued to grow not only due to religious demand, but also socioeconomic issues that also had a significant role in increasing its acceptability among Tunisians. The Group was specifically appealing to the “new social periphery” that arose in post-independence Tunisia in rural as well as semi-rural parts (Islam, 2015). They involved graduates of classical and religious colleges. Most of them believed that the government’s modernization process was deterring their social development, as well as young individuals emanating from modest backgrounds who were educated, yet they could not benefit via social promotion (Islam, 2015). This is because both groups were alienated by the new, westernized bourgeoisie. Activists from the Group, mostly from the country’s alienated southern and remote parts, opposed the sociocultural principles that the secular elites supported (Islam, 2015). For such alienated members of the Tunisian society, Islam became the basis for socio-religious movement as well as offered a political account to marshal the masses.

In the late Seventies, mosques were built in universities, and this spread the Group’s ideologies to students. This led to its activists’ stance to politicize it. This is because they interacted with PSD and leftist learners, as well as their contact with political ideologies as universities turned out to be grounds for intellectual conflicts (Sayyid, 2015). The Iranian Revolution of 1979 also contributed immensely in motivating the Group to participate in political activism. The Group held the Muslim Brotherhood philosophies that perceive the religion as a social, economic, as well as a political system, and not merely a religion, with the goal of making it cater for all the needs of the population (Sayyid, 2015). Consequently, the movement’s focus expounded to include issues to do with socioeconomic wellbeing.

However, it is until 1979 when the Islamic Group become Tunisia’s pioneer Islamic group to be involved in both religion and politics. This emerged when the Group named itself Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). The Eighties saw two important incidents in the MTI, which later played a key role in determining the political path of Ennahda in the post-2011 revolution (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). First, there were discussions within the group regarding the link between political and sociocultural activism. Second, the Islamists agreed to embrace pluralist politics as well as collaborate with other opposition movements (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). In 1988, MTI renamed Ennahda to conform to regulations that were passed by the government, which deterred the formation of parties on an ethnic or religious basis. In 1989, independent candidates from Ennahda took part in elections (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). Ben Ali’s regime was threatened by the participation of Ennahda and rigged the polls in favor of the ruling party.

Moreover, Ennahda’s entrance to the political scene led to a crackdown on its networks. For instance, in 1990, many of its followers were tortured, jailed, or subjected to other inhuman acts (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). Consequently, most of them feared and went into exile, more so in Europe. However, after the revolution that took place in Tunisia in 2011, Ennahda reinvigorated its efforts to grow its grassroots networks as well as enhancing its structure in preparation to enter into politics (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). Ennahda was licensed in March 2011, and in the elections that took place the same year, it emerged in the first place, garnering 37% of the votes (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). In collaboration with two other parties, it formed the government between 2011 and 2013 (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). However, in the Party’s Ninth General Congress that took place in 2012, participants seemed to differ concerning strategy and ideology (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). Therefore, the Party was divided into two: diehards, who held that the constitution should be based on sharia law, and rationalists, who favored a more flexible method.

Consequently, entry of Ennahda into electoral politics affected its ideology as well as its political position. In 2011, when it took power, it was compelled to make a coalition with other parties (Hamdar & Moore, 2015). This made the party discuss contentious topics considering the nature of Tunisia’s upcoming democracy with other secular partners, which often involved compromising its ideals. Political division in the Party, as well as across the country, surged in 2013 (Hamid & McCants, 2017). This created a crisis for Tunisia’s upcoming democratic test. In July 2013, the country’s secular opposition parties demonstrated and threatened to leave the National Constituent Assembly, which was meant to derail the re-writing of Tunisia’s constitution (Wolf, 2013). The demonstrations were caused by the political murder of two leftist politicians, as well as a surge in the cases of attacks against security agencies and government organizations by hardcore Salafists (Wolf, 2013). Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood supported the government was also overthrown in July, ending its democratic rule (Wolf, 2013). These occurrences made Ennahda realize that it had to waiver some ideological stances to maintain the country’s democracy as well as safeguard itself from being overthrown, as it was the case in Egypt (Wolf, 2013). It started to allow compromises with secularists.      

Ennahdha’s Shift from Religion to Politics

In 2016, Ennahdha made a landmark decision to shift from its religious background to focus fully on politics. The decision was made during its Tenth General Congress that was held in May 2016 (Grewal, 2018). According to the party’s president, Rached Ghannouchi, the change was not just an approach to leaving political Islam to shift to “Muslim democracy,” but also a consented approach of the party’s total participation in a democratic system (Grewal, 2018). He added that the party sought to renew itself in the political landscape without any involvement in religion. The leader intimated that there was a shift in the country since Islamists are now allowed to freely participate in the country’s political discourse, unlike before when they had to hide themselves (Meddeb, 2019). However, now they were free to be political actors. Fully focusing on politics meant that Ennahdha had to ignore its old mission as a revivalist group motivated by Muslim Brotherhood, which endeavored in incorporating Islamic doctrines in the society via cultural activities as well as preaching (Meddeb, 2019). Therefore, the party reveals itself as conservative political entity that can manage public affairs as well as reach consensus and compromise with secularist parties in Tunisia (Grewal, 2018). The party has redefined religion and politics, ignoring religious activities and stance in politics, and separating political activity from religious deliberations.

Furthermore, Ennahdha’s administration said that Tunisia’s shift to democracy, as well as the challenging regional and internal political contexts, compelled the party to adjust. However, the decision to concentrate on politics is problematic (Meddeb, 2019). The weakening of the focus on Islam in the movement’s ideology has caused an identity crisis, and this is anticipated to impose significant problems to the movement as it reevaluates the religion as a frame of reference, manages its key supporters and also appeal to the rest of the voters, as well as struggle with the movement’s neutralization as a catalyst of social change (Meddeb, 2019). Although the shift inferred a total restructuring, including removing all the party’s religious activities and dissolve or transfer them to religious or civil society organizations, that detachment has not fully occurred. This indicates the inconsistency that exists more than three years after the party’s decision (Meddeb, 2019). Abandoning political Islam is barely a foregone conclusion.

Ennahdha was legalized in 2011, after spending many years fighting against former authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, and it had to make important decisions. Consequently, it has shifted from an illegal opposition party to a valid party that has power and contests for votes in a pluralistic context (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). After choosing to focus on politics, the party relinquished political Islam as its overarching framework. However, the movement is thinking how to move from there and how to treat Islam in its present “Muslim democracy” project (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). How the party decides to deal with this identity crisis would not only affect its future internal and international legitimacy, but also the implementation of democracy in Tunisia, which the movement has significantly shaped since 2011(Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). Therefore, the party is compelled to address those challenges to be more effective as a political actor.  

 Factors that Necessitated the Politicization of Ennahda

The main issue that motivated Ennahda to shift from religion and focus on politics was transactional politics and pragmatism. Both Islamists as well secularists, were compelled to agree to work together to promote democracy in Tunisia (Hamid & McCants, 2017). This culminated in the national dialogue, which led to the consensus regarding the country’s constitution in 2014 (Hamid & McCants, 2017). The national dialogue involved three distinct aspects, and the result of each of them was pertinent to the progress of national reconciliation. The aspect of the constitution was meant to iron out issues like freedom of values, the place of women, the role of sharia, as well as blasphemy (Hamid & McCants, 2017). The government aspect encompassed the agreement on the composition of the cabinet that would lead the country into the elections that were scheduled later in 2014 (Hamid & McCants, 2017). This led to the resignation of the Ennahda-led regime and the takeover by an independent technocratic government. This happened after all parties in the dialogue agreed to the shift in power (Hamid & McCants, 2017). The electoral aspect had the mandate of coming up with a plan on how to choose members who would lead the National Independent Electoral Commission that was mandated to spearhead the upcoming elections (Hamid & McCants, 2017). These issues were critical to Tunisia’s democratization. 

Moreover, Ennahda aborted its plan to impose sharia laws in the constitution after increased demonstrations from the civil society as well as secularists. Making such decisions required the party to organize meetings as well as workshops with its hard-lined members to persuade them that their doctrinal positions could not be met in such a regional as well regional context (McCarthy, 2018). Political pressure, locally, and internationally, became a significant driver in convincing the party’s followers to heed to their pragmatic leaders who supported the compromise (McCarthy, 2018). For example, while the party’s hardcore members had supported the exclusion of the representatives of the former government from politics, its leaders opined that there was the need for reconciliation, especially with Nidaa Tounes, which was a party that was formed after the alliance between leftists, secularists, as well as Bourguibists (McCarthy, 2018). The quickly worsening regional context after Egypt’s coup, which took place in July 2013, further strengthened the leaders’ position that there was a need to collaborate with members of the former government to avoid the destabilization of the country (McCarthy, 2018). Therefore the country’s interests came first.

Eventually, the need for accommodation prevailed, and this led to the party opposing the exclusion of the former regime’s representatives. This stance, as well as other accommodations, assisted in revealing the national dialogue as a critical moment in pragmatic politics (Affan, 2016). The leaders in Ennahda believe that its accommodations were and remain essential in maintaining Tunisia’s democratic progress. At the same time, Tunisia’s 2014 constitution assured a neutral country (Affan, 2016). This means that there was no need for the country to be either secular or Islamic; instead, the focus was on enhancing the freedom of religion, belief, as well as though (Affan, 2016). For Ennahda’s leaders, the declaration of freedom of religion, as well as the identity of Muslims in the country, reached the party’s historical objective of reconstructing the society based on ideologies motivated by Islam.

Since the Islamization of the Tunisian society was no longer a significant priority, the party used its Tenth General Congress, which was held in 2016, to transform its identity to the demands of the country’s new constitution (Dell’Aguzzo & Sigillò, 2017). In the meeting, followers finally resolved a prolonged internal discussion regarding politics and religion. The members unanimously agreed that the party should focus on politics. To support the stance, the leadership of the party said that the move to leave religion was a natural process of its obligation to the new constitution’s ideals as well as the country’s democracy (Dell’Aguzzo & Sigillò, 2017). The leaders were committed to obey the constitution.    

Furthermore, the decision to specialize in politics; rather than merely dividing into religious and political subdivisions, like it has happened in Jordan as well as Morocco, indicates Ennahda’s commitment to pursue a political route. Consequently, religious activism is no longer a priority for the party (Meddeb, 2019). Essentially, Islamist groups that have tried to follow the two paths, religion and politics, often find themselves taking vague stances since they dread that they would damage their credibility with either political followers or their religious adherents (Meddeb, 2019). Aware of the danger of pursuing both politics and religion simultaneously, the party started a transformational endeavor that sought to transform it to a more liberal party to mitigate the ambiguity regarding whether its stance regarding various issues is inspired by religion or politics (Meddeb, 2019). Specializing in politics also was the party’s strategy to lure Tunisia’s reluctant international associates. Many debates in Western countries center on whether Islamic movements support democracy. International actors often preferred secular parties in Tunisia (Meddeb, 2019). The turbulent regional context, as well as some Gulf countries’ excess hatred towards political Islam, also led to the party’s shift to focus fully on politics.

Conclusion

At its inception, Ennahda Movement emphasized inclusion in Tunisia’s political process. This meant that the movement wanted to compete in the country’s political agenda as well as influence government policy. In various ways, the party’s specialization in politics in 2016 still valued inclusion. Consequently, the party’s leadership emphasized, to avoid repression, become legitimate, as well as deter the possibility of marginalization, the solution is to focus on political discourse. Unlike most Islamic movements in semi-authoritarian environments, the party decided not to divide into a political faction and a religious movement; instead, it chose to become a political party. This decision separated it from the social, cultural, as well as religious endeavors that dominated its activism in the earlier years. The illustration of the Ennahda Movement shows the problems that Islamist movements encounter in the change from authoritarian rule to democratic politics. They lose the advantages that they once enjoyed from religion. Like other entities, Islamic movements can fail to reach higher expectations from society. At the same time, their ideological supremacy is more bound to be challenged in a democratic environment, and their capability to offer social services fails to remain effective like before. However, such movements need to specialize in politics to adapt to the challenges that they face.  

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