Limitation Factors for the development of Sino-Russia Relations

Posted: January 4th, 2023

Limitation Factors for the development of Sino-Russia Relations

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Limitation Factors for the development of Sino-Russia Relations

Sino-Russian relations, also called China–Russia relations, refer to the international diplomatic relationships between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. The association between Russia and the Chinese considerably strengthened following the disbanding of the former USSR and the creation of the Russian Federation in 1991. The relationship between the two nations has developed so much since the 1860s to become one of the highly admirable national ties globally. Despite the strong ties between China and Russia that became more effective following the death of Mao Zedong and the collapse of the former USSR, tensions form part of the relations that some scholars think has an unpredictable future. The border disputes between the Northeast of China and Russian Far East, the conflicting trade interests, and increased alliances with other countries are some of the limiting factors for the strengthening of the Sino-Russia relations. The Chinese and the Russians enter into numerous pacts with the hope of sustaining their relationship, but the attempts do not seem to be yielding the anticipated results. The Chinese and the Russians continue to safeguard their interests even as they solve some of the stalemates that they experience while protecting Sino-Russian relations. The Chinese and the Russians would strengthen their strategic ties by practicing selflessness and working towards the benefit of all parties rather than engaging in acts that depict ill will. 

Forming the Relationship

The relationship between China and Russia trace its origin from the 17^th century when the leaders of the Qing Dynasty attempted to push out settlers from Russia, an incident that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The treaty of 1869 was the initial pact between China and Russia where the latter gave up the northern part of Amur River and the areas surrounding Lake Baikal, Stanovoy Range, and Argun River. The areas marked vital points within the border that opened avenues for products from Russia to enter the Chinese market. Both representatives from the Russian and Chinese sides were present to witness the treaty that calmed the border conflicts that had troubled the two countries for so long. The Treaty of Nerchinsk paved way for a relationship that would encounter ups and downs as the partners try to prevent its fall.

Fallout during the Cold War

The friendly relationship grew stronger with time until the Cold War (1947 – 1991) when evident ideological and doctrinal variations caused rivalry between the two nations. The Soviet Union had supported Mao Zedong’s resistance force (People’s Liberation Army) during the Chinese Civil War where the newly created PRC was clashing with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang that received support from the Americans. The friendly ties between the Russians and the Chinese lasted until 1956 when the Sino-Soviet split occurred (Kashin, Bin, Tatsumi & Jian, 2019). The incident that came to an end in 1966 saw the termination of the political connections between PRC and the Union of USSR (Soviet Socialist Republics). The main causes for the breakdown in relations were the struggle to dominate and regulate communism, and doctrinal variations on the interpretation and implementation of Marxism-Leninism, which aims at creating a society where social classes do not distinguish people (Kashin, Bin, Tatsumi & Jian, 2019). Other reasons for the Sino-Soviet split were the Chinese resentment of the closer relationship between the Soviet Union and the Indian government, and the Soviet’s support of a serene coexistence between the Eastern and Western blocs. Meanwhile, the Americans seized the opportunity to form closer ties with PRC, a relationship that led to President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 (Kashin, Bin, Tatsumi & Jian, 2019). The tension between the Russians and the Chinese did not result in major confrontations apart from a brief conflict in 1969 where the developed clashed over the border. The tussle between China and Russia started to fade after the demise of Zedong in 1976, but closer ties were not rebuilt until after 1991 when the Soviet Union fell. The Belavezha Accords of December 26, 1991 resulted in the disintegration of the USSR following increased turbulence in the national republics. The Supreme Soviet issued a declaration that issued independence to the affiliate republics of the USSR, which led countries such as Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldovia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and several others to develop their internal policies and constitutions (Kashin, Bin, Tatsumi & Jian, 2019). The fall of the USSR gave Russia and China a chance to rebuild its relationship.

Mending the Ties

The ties between Russia and China started to flourish a few months after collapse of the Soviet Union. President Boris Yeltsin of Russia made his initial state visit to China in 1992 to show Russia’s commitment to work with China in various fields. China also showed its commitment to relate with Russia in 1998 when Prime Minister Li Peng visited Moscow. Peng’s visit to Russia resulted in the formation of a joint working plan pledging to form a reliable and equal corporation. The coming together reinforced the views of the two sides that the U.S. was their arch rival and competitor in the global political context. The relationship between the two countries got a boost in 2001 with the formation of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. The pact would see both nations working together for twenty years to strengthen the countries’ military and economic prowess (Erkan & Ates, 2019). The strategic plan and agreement sought to regulate and suppress America’s military influence over the two regions, particularly in Central Asia (Erkan & Ates, 2019). China is today a major licensee and purchaser of military equipment from Russia, some of which have played key roles in improving the effectiveness of the People’s Liberation Army, and is also a key beneficiary of Russian pipeline that runs across the Pacific Ocean and Eastern Siberia (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). Furthermore, the policymakers in both nations have actively tried to enhance the trade relationships in the recent years, and it is not surprising that the depressions in the Chinese and Russian economies come at a time when the U.S. places stringent tariffs and trade measures on both countries.

Both Russia and PRC had serious concerns with the U.S. as of 2019, which put them on the same playing ground. China feels that the U.S. should cease its indulgence with matters touching on the South China Sea, and should loosen the strict trade policies that are already affecting business between the two states (Silvius, 2019). The Chinese also blame the U.S. for its claim that China pirates American technology. The Russians, on the other hand, blame the U.S. for placing serious economic sanctions on the country for taking Crimea from Ukraine. Though there is no formal agreement between China and Russia today, the two share a view to disagree with the Western interferences with their practices, and are contemplating putting tighter measures over their own affairs. Russia and China also share similar perceptions on cracking down on non-governmental organizations and censoring the internet as a way of taming the Western influence.

Limitations to Sino-Russian Relations

The U.S. and other countries should understand that the Russian-Chinese partnership is an intricate fusion, which they must take into account while developing their policies. Bolt (2014) and Feng and He (2017) argue that while the Sino-Russia relations are based in discontent with an America-led world order, it is not based in shared long-term objectives aimed at improving the world order. Hsu and Soong (2014) argue that although the partnership is presently strong, its future is not certain, because the fusion has never been as solid as it appears, nor as harmful. Some scholars vehemently doubt the tactical nature of the Sino-Russia relations and portray a dull perception of the future of the bilateral partnership, but Hsu and Soong (2014) think that it would be damaging to conclude that the tactical cooperation is entirely strategic, unfounded, and impetuous.

Border disputes between Russia and China continue to affect the relationships between the two countries. Lasserre and Alexeeva (2018) write that the border disputes between Russia and China started in the 1860s after the two nations became neighbors when the areas of the eastern part of Siberia, today called the Russian Far East, formed part of the Russian Empire (Tkachenko, 2017). Disagreements of the separation of the Sino-Russian border, the regulation of the migrant flow from China, and the joint utilization and exploration of the natural resources in the region have formed the subject of disagreements between the two nations since the eastern territories of Serbia became part of the Russian Empire.

Today, the Sino-Russian relations are significantly advancing on various strategic areas, but this does not imply that contradicting views do not exist. China’s President in the recent times attended an international convention in Russia to join other world leaders in discussing the main economic constraints Russia faces, as well as other developing nations and the world at large (Ismail, 2019). The Chinese President also visited China to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the two nations’ strategic alliance. The visit came a time when both Russia and China see the U.S. as a common enemy with America feeling that the nations are revisionist powers seeking to challenge the dominance of the U.S. Dmitri Trenin who serves at the Carnage Moscow Center termed the revived Sino-Russian relationship as a new guideline for other countries seeking to form partnerships (Ismail, 2019). A 2019 report by an intelligence team based in America indicates that the relationship between China and Russia will still flourish in future as the interests and desires between the partners continue to merge (Ismail, 2019). Despite the idea that the Sino-Russian relations are advancing on various strategic areas, this does not imply that clashing views and differences do not exist. Ismail (2019) writes that serious variations in their interests and worldviews exist, suggesting that their present relationship will not essentially result in an effective China-Russia world order.

The Chinese influence over the region and globally has an impact on the core areas that Russia perceives its own quarter of authority. Russia tries various ways to show its dominance in the post-USSR region, trying to control both the security and economic sectors through the formation of various treaties and strategic plans, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Ismail, 2019). The Chinese through the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, nevertheless, are creating economic constraints in the region that could interfere with Moscow’s influence that has lasted many decades. China has expressed its desire to manage the Road Initiative to the Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt as a way of avoiding secluding Russia from the affairs of Central Asia, and further said that it will halt its security roles in the region, at least for the moment (Ismail, 2019). The Chinese, however, are yet to classify and validate their assurance in taking part in the projects, which cause much apprehension for the Russians. The uncertainty surrounding China’s will to engage in the projects set to be completed by the two countries may derail the progress of the pact, and indicates that the relations may not advance as anticipated.

Another area that could create possible constraints for the Sino-Russian collaboration and rivalry in the coming years is the interest China and Russia have in the Arctic region. Russia is an arctic country, but the Chinese influence there is widening, and it perceives itself a country near the Arctic (Ismail, 2019). The PRC is also collaborating with states engaged in the region to participate in the governance of the Arctic region, and this gives it the opportunity to secure its entry to Arctic Sea and to safeguard its political and economic interests. The Chinese penetration on the Northern Sea Route could develop increased anxiety in Russia (Ismail, 2019). The Russian authorities are already obstructing the access of Chinese ships into some of the highly protected areas near the Arctic region, a sign that the pact may not progress smoothly as anticipated. Furthermore, increasing suspicion is developing in Moscow about the ultimate repercussions of China’s entry into the Arctic region as both nations are sensitive when dealing with matters of sovereignty (Ismail, 2019). The partners have to come up with quick and effective solutions to the issues touching on the Arctic to avoid affecting the relationship that has lasted several decades now.

The Chinese and the Russians seem to have clashing views about the Pacific because both countries border the ocean, and this could affect the Sino-Russian relationship while the two try to stretch their dominance over the region. Moscow moved to Asia by diversifying its partnerships in the region as relations with the U.S. and the EU soured in an attempt to play an influential role in the Arctic region (Ismail, 2019). The Russian government as a way of strengthening its authority over the area has alleviated its partnership with former affiliates in Cold War such as the Vietnamese and the Indian governments, and has built new partnerships with the administrators in Japan and South Korea (Ismail, 2019). Although the influence of Russia in the region still experience some hardships, mainly due to the economic restrictions placed by the U.S (Kaczmarsji, 2019). Furthermore, the Russians’ relationships with other Asian nations such as Vietnam, Japan, and India that have some interest on the regions surrounding the Pacific Ocean happen to affect the Sino-Russian relations.

Some evaluators think that the Chinese and Russian-led partnership faces complementary objections that could affect the coalition that has existed for many years now. Zbigniew Brzezinski mentions in his book The Grand Chessboard that the coalition between China and Russia is likely to experience considerable constraints, and compares the relationship with the Cold War period when the two countries developed ideological differences (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The only difference this time according to Brzezinski is the Chinese would want to dominate the leading position while Russia follows. China and Russia have similar objectives about the world order, but their descriptions of the notion diverge. The Russians want a world order with multiple poles such that power is shared equally among the leading powers (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The Chinese, on the other hand, feel that the influence of major powers in the international system would affect a country’s economic capacity. The Chinese administrators and entrepreneurs are devoted to supporting a joint venture with the Russians to avoid losing in its geopolitical clashes with Americans, and Russia shares the same view (Wilson, 2018). China further feels that the Russians alone cannot meet their economic wants and for that reason, Brzezinski thinks that the alliance between the two countries is not feasible. Maintaining the relationship would require both countries to find quick and effective solutions as soon as possible. 

The effects of Trade Disputes on Sino-Russia Relations

The Sino-Russia relations developed trading ties that has developed over the years, but many are skeptical the trade relations are without misunderstandings and challenges. The trading activities developed in the 1990s when the people of the Russian Far East could not get enough support from the government leading to the collapse of most companies in the region (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). PRC traders took advantage of the stalemate and crossed the border to sell food and clothes products at relatively lower prices. The inhabitants of Boris Yeltsin did not find the products to be of high quality but provided them a means of endurance for the local inhabitants that had been affected by the cumulative economic challenges that formed part of the region (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The continued economic crisis in the Russian Far East caused an increased interaction between the Chinese traders and the local inhabitants with the Chinese developing duty-free zones in China to attract buyers from the booming market that developed so abruptly (Vasilii, 2011). The North-East of China, particularly a place bordering Russia and the Chinese provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang hosted trade and production stations aimed at the Russian traders, as well as several warehouses, fruit and vegetables farms, and warehouses (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The trade between the two countries blossomed since then with the early 2000s offering an opportunity to grow the trade relations.

The trade ties between China and Russia continued to blossom even when the trading relations of other countries depreciated due to economic depressions. The economic crisis of 2008 did not have adverse effects on the trading practices between China and Russia, and even though the ties dropped in 2015 following the global economic downturn, the trade relations rebounded in 2017, boosted by the increased exports of Russian natural gas and oil and the sale of Russian military technologies and arms to their Chinese counterparts (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The Sino-Russia ties in terms of trade seem to have yield positive results. The volume of trade between the two countries has expanded nine fold, surpassing $95 billion in 2014 (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). China became Russia’s leading trading partner in 2017 for the eighth year running, with a trade volume of $84.7 billion, an upsurge of 20.9% compared to 2016 (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The trading ties between China and Russia appear to be strong but may experience a considerable drop if both parties do not focus on the possible constraints that could occur during interaction.

The trading practices between the Chinese and the Russians sometimes encounter considerable constraints, which could affect the relationship between the two countries. Until 2006, the growth in Sino-Russia trade relations was chiefly the outcome of the escalation in Russian exports to PRC, which had permitted Russia to sustain a trade surplus in its transactions with China. Nonetheless, Lasserre and Alexeeva (2018) assert that imports from PRC suddenly expanded, enhanced by the high demand for consumer products in Siberia and the Russian Far East. The increased imports into Russia since 2007 explain why overall, the trade imbalance has remained at the advantage of the Chinese (Ying, 2016). Furthermore, the Sino-Russia trade relationship is experiencing radical alterations in the trade structure that could have detrimental effects on the interaction. Some Russian trade items still lead the country’s exports to the PRC, including metals such as aluminum and copper, wood and petroleum products. Russia’s exportation of hydrocarbons to China also continues to grow.  The delivery of Russian hydrocarbons, for instance, formed about 15% of the country’s exports to PRC in the early 2000s, but the share escalated to more than 65% when 2017 came to an end (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The era during which the Russians hoped to sell its manufacturing items and technology to PRC appears to have passed. The engineering products and tools that formed at least 20% of the Russian exports in the early 2000s did not feature predominantly in 2017 (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). The CPR’s exports to Russia have also changed considerably. Chinese items such as clothes and shoes prevailed in 2002 covering more than 45% while manufacturing tools prevailed in 2017 consuming more than 42% of the local market. Overall, the proportion of personal and household items such as clothing, utensils, and electronics has fallen significantly to less than 23%, although they still lead in the East of Siberia and the local markets in the Russian Far East. The feeling by Russia that it plays a lower role in its trade relations with China, and that the latter makes the most gain could affect the Sino-Russia relationship that became steadier after the fall of the USSR.

Competing for Dominance

The Russians feel that the Chinese exploration of other markets, and their dominance of the Russia Far East deny Russia considerable economic benefits, a feeling that equally pushes it to form partnerships with other Asian countries. The economic operations of China in Russia became increasingly diversified in the 2000s following the growth in trade between the Russian and Chinese border regions, especially between North-East China and the Russian Far East (Barannikova & Dou, 2015). The Chinese ventured deeply into tourism, agriculture, construction, and exploration of the natural resources in the region (Barannikova & Dou, 2015). Chinese traders explored farther into the western parts of Russia, slowly expanding their trade operations to cover the entire former USSR. Chinese politicians and researchers often perceive the escalating interrelations of the border regions with much optimism because they argue it is a natural way of achieving regional integration and a sign of proper partnership between the two neighbors. The Russians, however, view the move by the Chinese as a motive to exploit the Russians and have resorted to forming partnerships with countries in East Asia to develop its workforce, projects, credit, and technologies (Trenin, 2012). The Russians feel that exploring farther into East Asia will offer quick and effective solutions to the tribulations of the Russian Far East. The Russians further feel that the Chinese dominance of the Russian Far East build the economy of North-East China because of the large number of people migrating into the Chinese territory while others move to the European part of Russia (Trenin, 2012). The demographic disparities between the two border areas worry the Russian administration where the situation has caused uncertain reactions. Whilst eager to advance the Russian Far East and to control its numerous resources, the federal authorities in Russia are hesitant to provide the Chinese dominance without charge in the land for fear of losing authority of developing the region’s economy.

The tensions looming between Russia and China about the exploration of Central Asia by both countries could dampen the Sino-Russia relations. The PRC’s schemes that began by primarily aiming the development of infrastructures in Central Asia has been received with much doubt by the Russians who see the progress by the Chinese as a risk to its political and monetary interests (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of very close trade ties between the Chinese and the nations of the Central Asia has progressed in parallel with slow attrition of Russian dominance in the region (Younkyoo & Stephen, 2013). The PRC is currently the foremost trading partner of countries in Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2018). China provides these Central Asian countries with appealing loan terms and invests in various industrial programs. The Russians cannot battle with the bid by the PRC and tend to be gradually and predictably losing its dominance within Eurasia in spite of the formation of a regional project such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Saif-ur-Rehman & Kayani, 2015). The chief goal of such a venture on Russia’s part was to facilitate unrestricted flow of money, people, and trade commodities between the affiliated countries and to promote the concept of interdependence that would foster trade and industry relations between the Russians and the states in Central Asia. Both countries must recognize the effects of such competitions on Sino-Russia relations and adopt the suitable remedies.

Actions by both Countries to Maintain the Partnership

The Chinese and the Russians understand the values of their partnership, and always develop mechanisms to strengthen the ties and to prevent further disagreement. Beijing and Moscow, for example, developed and adopted a joint program to enhance cooperation and development between the regions of North-East of China and Eastern Siberia and Russian Far East (Brenton, 2013). The program adopted in 2009 provided details of 160 projects to be completed jointly by the end of 2018, 94 of which were to be implemented in Russia (Brenton, 2013). Although the collaboration program was properly outlined on paper, the venture did not manage to give substantial economic outcome as a result of inadequate financing by both parties, especially by the Russians who not wish to reinstate their intentions to see the projects through completion. Consequently, as at 2017 only 22 of the projects were underway whilst the rest have been abandoned or suspended for a variety of reasons. A good instance was the stoppage of the building of the Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye suspension bridge that would considerably reduce the duration and price of moving between the bordering towns of Russia and North-East China. Although the deal detailing its construction was developed as early as 2008, the practical outline detailing its construction was only clarified in 2013.

Moscow has singed numerous new industrial cooperation pacts with Beijing since 2014 with the hope of maintaining the relationship. Beijing, for example, entered into a massive gas contract with Beijing worth nearly $400 billion for the yearly delivery of at least 37 billion cubic meters of gas to PRC until 2048 (Monks, 2019). Various media companies often see the massive contract as a sign of the new rapprochement between China and Russia. The deal materialized after both parties entered into tough negotiations that lasted nearly a decade to arrive at the most suitable price of gas and the cost of installing the pipelines (Monks, 2019). Critics feel that the deal may experience considerable constraints considering that it was signed under much global tensions, and because the pact and its associated conditions have still not been made public. Many specialists think that for the pact to be signed so quickly if Moscow would give in to the demands by the Chinese on price (Monks, 2019). The political goodwill by the Russian government has not compelled the Chinese state officials to be cooperative on matters touching on the economy. The Chinese have instead taken advantage of the political goodwill by Russia to increase its conditions on prices and infiltration into the country’s local markets (Younkyoo & Fabio, 2013). Russian entrepreneurs who thought the banks in China would give capital thereby alleviating the adverse repercussion of Western sanctions were rapidly disheartened by the lack of commitment on the side of their Chinese counterparts who insisted on conditions that were challenging for the Russians to accept (Monks, 2019). The attempts to reinstate the Sino-Russia relations may fail if such efforts to strengthen the ties still experience considerable setbacks.

China and Russia recognize the importance of addressing their clashing interests in Central Asia and have since engaged in negotiations although considerable challenges still loom between the two nations. The two sides came together to advocate for the Russian EEU program and the Chinese Belt-One Road Initiative (BRI) initiative with the hopes of attenuating the Sino-Russian conflicts in Central Asia (Timofeev, Filippova & Lissovolik, 2017). Both sides hoped to come up with a plan on how all parties will benefit, but up to today the terms of the negotiations remain a vague concept because of variations in visualization on the one hand, and prevailing obstacles of communication between Russia and China on the other hand (Timofeev, Filippova & Lissovolik, 2017). The Russians, for instance, would want the Chinese to acknowledge the EEU as an important partner in the negotiations with the nations of Central Asia, whereas China considers the EEU as an initiative of their own effort, the main objective of which is to safeguard the interests of BRI (Timofeev, Filippova & Lissovolik, 2017). The real and practical frameworks of the Chinese and Russia relations in Central Asia have, therefore, are yet to be attained and clarified.

Conclusion

The Sino-Russia relations is one of the long-lasting partnerships between countries, and even though the two partners seem to be getting along well, the PRC and Russia should consider ways of overcoming the possible threats that could affect the relationship. Since the alignments in the 1860s, China and Russia have worked together apart from during the Cold War when the two developed contrasting doctrinal views regarding the application of Marxism-Leninism. The death of Mao Zedong and the collapse of the Soviet Union gave both countries a good chance to rekindle their relationship that transformed into a strong strategic partnership. Both countries have since interacted on various platforms, especially in trade where they sell and buy from each other. Border disputes, however, still pose considerable challenges to the development of the Sino-Russia relations in the same way as the trade disputes. The Russians feel that the Chinese are taking more share in Russia than they deserve, especially with their dominance in the Russian Far East. The trade disparity between the Chinese exports to Russia and the latter’s export to China worries the Russian authorities who are contemplating putting stricter measures on their partner and neighbor. Both countries have interest in expanding their ties with other nations, which further creates tension between the partners. Russia feels that the entry of China in Central Asia is aimed at replacing its interest in the region, and Putin’s government sees the move as ill-placed and competitive. China and Russia are optimistic the relations will prevail, but scholars are pessimistic judging from the deadlocks both countries experience each time they try to form a deal. Russia and China will only witness considerable and blameless relations when both countries develop a clear consensus to guide the partnership, and when the parties act with objective of benefitting all sides. 

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