Social Media in China

Posted: January 4th, 2023

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Social Media in China

1. Introduction

Within the global environment, people associate China to a diversified product and service guru engaged in high technology and manufacturing processes to avail innovative goods in the global market. Some of these products and services include Xiaomi mobile phones, Alibaba, and Sina weibo online platform. The China’s population is four fold higher in comparison to the US. With such a huge populous, the Chinese government has been keen on monitoring and regulating services and products to ensure the espoused guidelines concerning information disbursement and censorship are adhered to (Scobell, et al. 94). For business enterprises or private establishment who have previously engaged in business endeavors in China or with its government, they criticize the dissidents and crackdowns facilitated by Chinese authoritative bodies as a mode of monitoring, surveilling as well censoring any form of information detrimental to the Communist Party’s agenda (Yang 1364). Even with physical evidence of this action against the netizens, there has been limited academic information evaluating its intricacies particularly for people outside China.  However, various studies have been conducted with the intention of understanding the censorship controls applied in regulating social media activities in China. According to a study undertaken by Gary King, a professor arts Weatherhead University working in collaboration with Harvard University team, various deductions have been made that are fundamentally important in understanding the monitoring and regulation of Chinese social media sites. Firstly, censorship in China is a real agenda with set limits. The results showed that t some content under suppression include topics on hot issues, adulterated contents, and self-critical posts and x-rated media such as pornography (King, et al. 330). From a close analysis, contents reiterating on information aimed criticizing the government would be routinely ignored because most of it highlighted on social issues or cured from foreign news. 

Secondly, information friction is highly significant in facilitating the monitoring process. This activity is defined as a procedural process that places constraints on data accessibility. For instance from the findings, the team access to information is considered less desirable based on limitations on VPN services which consequently slows the internet down (King, et al. 333). Judging from this result, the Chinese government applies this tactic to ensure people opt for fast and easily accessible information because speed is prioritized when browsing or using the internet. Thirdly, the team discovered information flooding as an additional measure that involves imposition of a small fee charged to individuals who post pro-government on social media platform. The main effect of this activity is to crowd out other timeline content to reduce its visibility on social media feeds (Scobell, et al. 99). This translates to users opting to scroll through hundreds of posts to identify reach the targeted one. Unfortunately, most users opt to forgo this time consuming process (King, et al. 335). Therefore, information flooding works perfectly in drowning posts or information considered undesirable by the Chinese government. This tactic has been very useful in promoting content which portrays the régime positively so as to sway the citizens to develop a similar perspective. From this study, it is clear the government prioritizes information gathering and regulation (Yang 1365). The motivational factor driving this stance is mounting its control over public perceptions and of netizens that utilize social media platforms. This discourse focuses on demonstrating the varied initiatives undertaken by this government to regulate and monitor information through censorship as it is not only ineffective in promoting a good relationship with the public but infringes on the universal right of communication and self-expression. Even with the placed barriers reinforced by the Government, the incorporation of restrictions limiting social media access and keyword filters deterring the Chinese netizens from forwarding their public opinions freely, this community has developed self-efficiency in identifying and utilizing others mechanisms of access in order to present their views on social media on topics considered taboo as well as interact on banned social media platforms.  

 2. Background

Explanation of Social Media Policies in China

The social media policies implemented serve the protective purpose of ensuring there is limited access to information that might reflect negatively on the government’s narrative or provide information on its problems. However, the controls are camouflaged as a manipulation tactic through varied collaborations with mechanisms that drive this agenda and additional contextual efforts. The main justification provided by the Chinese government in enacting social policies that promotes regulation and surveille is founded controls views pertaining to government issues and their respective departments (Yang 1367). Currently, the government has resorted to integrating private and public corporations in facilitating internet sanitization to limit the need for centralized guardianship and the use of coercive force. By citing the significance of establishing a harmonious internet environment, the Central Propaganda Department as an extension of the government has engaged business entities on various platforms (Qin and Wu 131). Firstly, it is has achieved this through arranging for summons where corporates and individual enterprises via their representatives are engaged in a lecture on the importance of a healthy internet where the online environment is pacified and purged off debates over contentious topics such as minorities and religion, hate speech, and pornography (King, et al. 337). The main aim of this meeting is to solicit subsequent trade agreements where the firms are manipulated into partaking in the execution of this objective.

 It is important to note, in as much as the decision to collaborate with the government on social media regulation is unwise, which is further worsened by failing to attend summon invites, many businesses are complaint in order to avoid being perceived as harboring different views, or lacking a moral stand on social service stability (King, et al. 339). Therefore in most instances, the agreement to partner with the government emanates from the need to demonstrate they relate with the authoritarian developmental ethos in portraying online environment pacification as a move towards political and social stability (Scobell, et al. 100). Therefore, through the partnerships and collaborative efforts, the outcome should benefit all society actors inclusive of the private enterprises by boosting sustained and economic growth. Another profound factor influencing public and private corporations into partnering with the government is to reinforce social media monitoring as an avoidance tactic of being perceived as downplaying the risks associated with unregulated internet content (Yang 1378). This statement is supported by a proclamation made by a quasi-governmental city of China official alluding to sanctions of companies that failed to observe the importance of self-discipline elemental in establishing a healthy online environment. This retaliation is in line with an account made by another official in September 2011 while at Beijing highlighting on government efforts towards increasing compliance of business and industries towards social media regulation. Policies aimed at sanitizing the online environment in China are driven by both the state governments as well as the corporations operating within its environment under the obligation of complying to the regulatory measures placed in order to presented impenetrable and united front in dealing with information censorship.

By leveraging the public-private inclusivity in internet sanitization efforts, the Chinese government has been able to avoid implementation of a centralized guardianship and use of coercion (King, et al. 340). It is more on self-censorship, censorship and routine surveillance by blog service providers and internet. These methodologies are cost-effective methods encouraging more efficient monitoring efforts on the civil Society and any form of dissent. A form of self-censorship is applied by internet media companies in demonstrating the compliance. Examples of these entities include NetEase, Sina, Tencent, Baidu, Sohu and iFeng that filter and removal of any information out of line in compliance to the internet regulation or has the potential to cause the destabilization of harmony in the online environment by spreading propaganda (Yang 1376). Foreign online platforms have been subject to blockage due to the lack of resources required in censorship. This activity has contributed immense outrage from Chinese netizens citing the social stability agenda as an intrusion and a lack of consideration to SME’s who rely heavily on foreign social media platforms to drive their business and assure their upward mobility. According to Qiang’s article, the Chinese government through its various departments has been able to control social media affordances by coming up with different social media policies for these departments.

3. Discussion

A. Blocking Websites

Global social media providers including Facebook have a substantive number of users worldwide with the exemption of China. Different technologies have been used by the Great Wall in facilitating the blockage of foreign social media sites as well as the related web pages (Qin and Wu 132). This mechanisms utilize IP address restrictions. Most of them are banned by the Chinese government in order to regulate internet content which can be done through deletion or absolute ban if the information posted is not in the best interest of the country (Yang 1377). Dubbed as the great firewall, this mechanism is set up with intricate censorship protocols that restrict citizens from gaining access, posting or using any sanctioned content. There are various reasons why this the wide range of online platforms are banned from China (Lewis 689). The Facebook ban was implemented after it was deemed as incendiary and unsavory. The incidences that contributed to Facebook’s banning includes the Urumqi riots that occurred in the Chinese Western province, Xinjiang (Scobell, et al. 113).  According to the government, Facebook was utilized as the main source of communication between the rioters and the Xian Jing independent activists (Zhao and Liu 42). The  justification presented by China in effecting the ban as well as other social media sites such as Snapchat, twitter, Pinterest, YouTube, and reedit is to limit social media misuse through activities that portray anti-government, corruption, and fraudulent content (Che and Ip 34). This has led to the implementation of administrative regulations and substantial legal restrictions aimed at monitoring and regulating internet usage and availability. Agencies in collaboration with the Chinese government in the execution of this legislation include General Administration of Press and Publication, the Cyberspace Administration of China, and the China State Internet Information Office.

A study conducted by Chen and Yang (2018) provide myriad of reasons as to why the Chinese government has established a tendency of extending its media censorship to foreign social media outlets. This research was a field experiment which measured the impact of providing Chinese netizens with a direct asset access 2 uncensored content from foreign websites (Chen and Yang 20). Through tracking the participant’s economic beliefs, media consumption, and behavioral changes over the 18-month period, as well as the political attitudes in order to fully comprehend the rationality applied by the Chinese government and its related authoritative body in limiting access to foreign social media platforms. The first observation on treated participants indicated that access to uncensored information increase the awareness of politically sensitive events ranging from the Xianjiang government’s efforts to increase automobile surveillance to President Trump’s visit to China for business. The awareness was measured based on their scores in various quizzes assigned (Chen and Yang 21). The treated students had the highest score signifying the increased knowledge-ability. The second finding indicated that the newly exposed participants came to a realization of censorship of highly sensitive contemporary issues that were lacking in the domestic news outlets. From this deduction, it is clear the Chinese government limit access to foreign social content in order to have a regulated control over the level of informed-ness possessed by the Chinese netizens.

The second finding indicated that access to uncensored content was likely to increase the level of pessimism demonstrated by Chinese netizens towards the country’s economic performance. In the experiment, when the students were asked to provide an intelligent guess on the country’s GDP growth rate as of 2017, the treated group cited a figure of 5.92 percent (Chen and Yang 21). We are a group A and C students provided figures that were 0.90 percent higher (Chen and Yang 22). When comparing these two figures, the group AE figure signifies decreased optimism towards the government expected growth targets which is at 6.50 percent. The lower prediction was actually lower than the actual demonstrating the impact of access to uncensored content basing on the change in economic beliefs about China (Chen and Yang 23). Basing on the fact the Chinese government is heavily invested on having ultimate control of a public opinion including its economic performance, this deduction provides irrefutable justification on the necessity to limit access to foreign content by the Chinese netizens.

The third finding reveals that uncensored content as an influential effects in changing political attitudes towards the government (Chen and Yang 24). In this research, when the treated group AE students to provide the individual evaluation on government performance in politics and economics, on a 0 to 10 scale, they give a rating of 1.254. Disfigure was lower in comparison to that provided by the unexposed students in group A and C (Chen and Yang 25). These results demonstrated that the students exposed to uncensored content portrayed a lowered Trust towards the Chinese central government as well as a decreased political Trust (Chen and Yang 24). In addition to this, the AE group was more likely to suggest of enacting fundamental changes in the country’s political and economic systems in order to improve its performance. Judging from this collaboration, uncensored content has a profound influence on determining citizens satisfaction on the government’s performance, therefore, the Chinese authority is threatened by The Likely possibilities or establishing a democratic Society with free access to information as it would lead to activism propagated bite people in a bid to ensure more effective political and economic systems are reinforced.

b. Censorship

The Chinese government endeavors to remain in control in terms of controlling public opinion particularly on sensitive matters such as leadership and politics. On a global scale, china is the most restricted and regulated in terms of Media access and internet control (Yang 1380). Censorship is one of the most effective and methods applied on a large scale through the application of technological sophistication. The great firewall imposes administrative regulations are enforced by a legal structure whereby within domestic confines, china netizen and business Enterprises in Casa via political and from posting content that is considered objectionable and threatening to the state. This is the primary reason given by the Chinese government which has led to domestic Media outlets implementing self-censorship mechanism applied in the editorial processes as required by the propaganda department of Communist Party of China. In 2016, civil Society activities, government corruption, health and safety issues, ethnic tensions, and media censorship were some of the topics that were heavily and extensively censored (Scobell, et al. 116). On domestic social media platforms, there is a considerable level of limited transmission relating to politically sensitive content. The restriction is mainly due to export contacts deletion as well as wide ranging keyword filters integrated within the online platform.

In developing an understanding concerning censorship and its execution within China, it is imperative to evaluate each particular methodology applied and the parties involved to fully grasp the extent of this regulation. An evaluation of China’s constitution reveals that the citizens are afforded with a freedom of press and speech however the level of opacity is by the media is limited due to the media regulation institutionalized by the authorities. For instance, law enforcement is allowed to conduct crackdown on media houses that publish stories with the aim of the exposing issues within the state that is subsequently received as an endangerment to the country (Che & Michael 37). The revision conducted on the law on Guardian state secrets in April 2010 was a further reinstatement on the existing regulatory laws over the flow of information within the country. This amendment reinforce the government’s mandate requiring telecommunication operators and internet companies to comply and demonstrate corporation during investigation aimed at identifying state secret leaks. This is evidently a form of censorship based on their vagueness in establishing definitive understanding on the term “state secrets” (Scobell, et al. 116). Without any defined premises, the Chinese government can then facilitate censorship of any particular information that is deemed detrimental to economic or political interests. Additionally, this has placed Media houses as well as businesses in a dilemma in intricately finding the clear cut line between information that warrants censoring further limiting their press freedom.

The second technique applied by the Chinese government in exerting control over the use of internet and the flow of information is in applying technical methods. Myriad of ways have been deployed in internet censorship. According to experts, processes used include brandwith throttling, wholesale blocking and keyword filtering. They work against website access to sites such as Google (Zhao and Liu 45). Other diversified methods applied include inducing Crest and journalist to exercise self-censorship and forced by tactics such as emotions and dismissals, fine, libel lawsuit and the dissolution of news outlets. The seriousness of this censorship concerning journalist and activist has been seen in various events.  In February 2014, 70 netizens and 30 journalists inclusive of cyber dissidents, online journalists and bloggers was sentenced to serve in prison. Another incident involved Liu Xiabo, Chinese rights activist, who is currently serving an 11-year sentence because of advocating for freedom of speech and the Reformation of the Democratic constitution in charter 08. This event contributed to his Nobel Peace Prize award. Another journalist that has been in prison on the basis of rebelling against censorship is Tan Zuoren. She was sentenced for a 5-year prison due to his investigation into the massive death of children in the 2008 earthquake which he attributed to poor construction of educational facilities (Hu and Zheng 382). He also cited government corruption as a contributing factor leading to this devastating occurrence. These events provide a visual outlook on the extent to which the Chinese government has asserted its control over media and social media as a means to an end inconsiderate of the negative impact it has had on the Chinese community particularly with the harassment, imprisonment, intimidation and coercion methods it has applied in this effort.

c. Surveillance/Monitoring

The government’s adoption of the internet and consequent adoption of social media has propelled certain aspects of its controlling functions which have had a general impact on the usage of the internet (Che & Michael 37). There are more than a dozen government entities which are engaged in the surveillance and monitoring of social media usage within, from, and into China (Hu and Zheng 382). The most influential of these bodies include the Communist party central propaganda department. It collaborates with the state administration of Radio, film and Television and the general administration of press and publication in ensuring effective monitoring measures are in place that aim to promote content that appears to the party doctrine (Yang 1375). One of the state news agency that has been cited as a propaganda tool used by the government in monitoring, surveillance, and swaying the public opinion is Xinhua. There are also various Ministries that are involved in this activities which act as subordinate fiefdom exerting control over social media content. Through the consolidation by the state council information office, this subsections have been effective in conducting internet monitoring.

One of the major ways in which the Communist party central propaganda department monitors coverage of highly sensitive political topics include availing editorial guidelines to media outlets mandating restrictive measures on the information availed for public consumption pertaining to political events (Scobell, et al. 120). An example of this thorough monitoring protocol is the occurrence of a high-profile event that involved the Southern Weekly whereby the published New Year’s message was written by government censors. It was changed from calling into a comparative political reforms and into a Communist party tribute supporting government efforts (Zhao and Liu 43). The outrage that followed included mass demonstrations by the general public and the staff at the magazine demanding 4 the local propaganda Bureau chief to resign with immediate effect. In spite of a compromise being achieved, the paper was censored and the official failed to resign (Hu and Zheng 385). The circumstances surrounding this event is clearly indicative of the extent the Chinese government has invested into monitoring and surveillance measures in tightening its censorship mandate.

Chinese government is trying to protect their position ensuring the Watchdog censorship group effectively execute its duties. The press is intimidated and harassed in instances where they have demonstrated rules violation. Media outlet have also been coerced into self- censorship in order to avoid the severe punishment reinforced by the state (Qin and Wu 141). According to some of the reporters, this intimidation is used by the government in leveraging the Chinese Media outlets to also engage in surveillance and monitoring of political content through invested individual monitors (Lewis 690). Secondly, the Communist Party propaganda department in collaboration with the bureau of internal affairs further push for extensive surveillance bye circulating censorship guidelines on a weekly basis to prominent Media providers and editors.

The Chinese government is also observed to financing media outlets as well as website in order to propagate government targeted messages to the public (Qin and Wu 142). The China News Network Corporation, which operates on a 24-hour basis is cited to be privately owned by the government therefore limiting Media plurality. In addition to this, this move is aimed at limiting the freewill by the media in disseminating information freely without any restrictions by the state or private organizations (Zhao and Liu 45). Currently, according to publicists, the Chinese Media is populist and socialist based on the control the government has in limiting its influence on public opinion. The government uses keyword protection to ensure that anti-government information is suppressed and that the message stays as presented by its communication department (Che & Michael 64)

d. Chinese Netizens are Finding ways to know Truth

Social media is used by the government as a political tool reinforced by the policies in order to ensure absolute control on public opinions (Zhao and Liu 42). This has led to them netizens discovering varied ways of sharing non-propagandist information in a manner which protects them from being identified by the government systems. In order to access the dozen tools that can be used to bypass censorship, internet users in China can achieve this by either through free infiltration or pay an amount of $25 on a monthly basis. The more expensive tools provide a good and fast internet connection particularly during political events such as the People’s Congress which is conducted annually. The ability to connect is prioritized particularly during this occasions as the government usually shut down VPN service connection. According to statistics one to 8% of Chinese internet users bypass censorship by purchasing and utilizing this tools (Scobell, et al. 121). The availability of this mechanism has provided a Prima facie support to the Chinese netizens deterring them from demanding access to the available and censored content online.

Various methods have been developed in bypassing the great firewall which is the core mechanism limiting Chinese netizens from accessing online content from Banned website (Hu and Zheng 388). Firstly, some online service providers have partnered with anti-censorship organization to develop application customized in a way that facilitates access to banned sites through bypassing the great firewall (Qin and Wu 143). Some of the procedures provided in accessing such applications include sending blank email message to the banned site email address. This is then followed by the reception of an automated response from the anti-censorship organize working collaboratively with the band site. The message usually contains a link to download the application. One of the main advantages of this application is providing data encryption their full information can be carried across networks (Zhao and Liu 42).  Additionally, the usage of proxy technology is commonly integrated as a means of defeating censorship as well as securing connection through traffic transmission. It is also important to Note that, in avoiding detection this applications are designed to avoid logging any personal information that can lead to the identification of the user hence the software is considered an open source (Chen and Ahn 34). Chinese internet users have benefited greatly from this application considering the extent of technical sophistication applied in reinforcing online censorship. With the availability of this application, it has become easier for netizens to have reliable access. These amenities have ensured they execute the right to information on a global scale.

The usage of VPN is the second method used by Chinese netizens in bypassing the firewall. Given that the firewall is an extensively thorough filtering system, it has ensured great censorship and prohibition of users from accessing social media platforms as well as many websites (Hu and Zheng 389). This circumstance is the motivational Factor leading to the development of VPN service essential in circumventing the great firewall. The protocol followed commences with the signing up for this service which also offers propriety chameleon technology which is unaffected by VPN blocking. It operates through scrabbling open VPN meta-data packets. In ensuring limited identification, it applies the Deep packet inspection while ensuring the user enjoys the lightweight and fast internet connectivity and access to information. The user then downloads the VPN by following the instructions prompted in order to launch the application (Chen and Ahn 45). This service can be used on any device availing the flexibility and convenience to the user. In order to access any blocked website the user then selects the server to connect from the 70 server locations provided. , once connected the user can utilize the internet connection in assessing both censored and uncensored content in various online platforms.

Other mechanisms of access that have been used and are currently under the Threat of blockage by the great firewall of China is the Tor anonymity network. It is a systematic online framework which has provided its uses with free internet access devoid of any restrictions. It is consisted of block trackers where visited websites are isolated to limit any advertisements and then ensure cookies are automatically cleared in order to provide user the protection they require from being detected (Chen and Ahn 56). The browser is greatly refer preferred by Chinese netizens as it provides the necessary protection required by the users when visiting websites restricted by the Great firewall. Thirdly, the website avoids fingerprinting by ensuring all the users r similar despite having different device information and browser content. It also has a multi-layered m which encrypts the users’ traffic three times as it passes over the network. This is a protective measure executed by Tor relays to better serve the user by protecting the identity.

Proxy server are also used in circumventing The Great firewall of China. This happens through SOCKS or HTTPs in dealing with sophisticated sensors. This method solve the issue pertaining to Geographic freedom as well as Internet speed connectivity (Chen and Ahn 29). Through encryption, mechanism such as Sentinel utilize SOCKS5 which applies RSA and SSH protocols that facilitates data transference securely over networks. Technology-savvy Chinese programmers also rely heavily on open source proxy known as Shadowsocks specifically designed to circumvent the great firewall. According to reports, the government has enacted various efforts in a bid to limit its use and spread within the netizen community. It applies the technique known as proxying whereby the user is able to connect to a wider internet. The rationale is changing the proxy server location in order to facilitate easy access to banned social media services and online platforms (Chen and Ahn 37).  For instance, is the proxy server china user is using has an Australian coding, they will be able to connect to Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Twitters amongst other banned sites (Chen and Ahn 68). The Shadowsocks can be a huge problem for the Chinese government based on the facts that it generates encrypted connections between the local computer and the client as well as the proxy server in order to establish an open source internet. This has made it difficult for the great firewall identify traffic and its end destination therefore limiting is censorship or blockage. The software has been described as highly complex based on the fact that it was created by for-coders, however, in spite of the difficulty in setting it up, it has become a popular method for Chinese netizens to access information freely.

 Conclusion  

Authoritarian regimes, case in point, the China government have exerted substantive efforts in imposing absolute control on social media utilisation and access. Various methods have been applied ranging from intimidation, government financing of Media outlets as well as establishing technologically advanced mechanism such as the great firewall as a means of limiting information dissemination through social media platforms and the internet. This has been an extensive debate globally highlighting the detrimental effect of imposing censorship protocols in order to maintain leadership and political power. Despite the implementation of systematic control of information, chinese netizens have established ways on how to access content through virtual private networks and proxy servers as well as sites such as weibo where they are able to discuss topics considered controversial and present their opinion without any deterrence. It is also important to note that, considering the immense Crackdown thats have occur in China in reprimanding of users accessing censored content, the netizens have established homophone and visual pun intended to relay information such as acronyms, slang, memes and images in order to avoid censorship or restrictions (Lewis 695). Even with this method of circumventing the great firewall and censorship, in some instances the government has been able to crack down various social networks such as we chat going further to delete political and prominent liberal accounts. New regulations have also been place in monitoring instant messaging tool in order to enforce censorship to content considered unsavory.

As of 2013, the total number of Chinese internet users was at 6:18 million. Even with the increase in the number of people calling for total press freedom in this country, the Chinese Media landscape remains restrictive further complicating the relationship between the netizens and the government (Zhao and Liu 46). The government has remained adamant in ensuring it gains absolute control over information secluding china from interacting with in global platforms. The country has also been subject to conflict with other States such as United States that have endeavored to invest the efforts in weakening censorship in Nations such as China and Iran with repressive governments. Suspension of foreign Correspondents seeking to gain more information on potentially serve sensitive topics such as government performance and corruption, china has also demonstrated an unwelcoming reception to other nations that seek to establish interaction with this nation on a global scale.

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